Grievousness of injury is not an ingredient of Section 307. Intention or knowledge is. A simple hurt — or no hurt at all — does not take a case outside attempt to murder, and a medical opinion that an injury was “not dangerous to life” cannot by itself decide the question.
So held a Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran in Surender Kumar v. State of Haryana, decided on 8 September 2026.
And the petitioner lost. That is not a contradiction, and it is the part worth understanding. He won the legal argument and lost the case, on a ground that has nothing to do with medicine.
The case at a glance
| Case | Surender Kumar v. State of Haryana and Others |
| Citation | 2026 INSC 1006 · 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 953 · Reportable |
| Proceeding | Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 14611 of 2026 — dismissed without leave being granted |
| Bench | J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. |
| Date | 8 September 2026 |
| Who applied | The complainant side — the petitioner was himself assaulted and is the brother of the injured man |
| What was sought | Alteration of the charge to add Section 307 IPC, after the prosecution witnesses had been examined |
| Result | SLP dismissed. Section 307 not added. But the reasoning of the courts below was disapproved |
Read the judgment
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What happened
The dispute began over waterlogging caused by the draining of rainwater. It led to an assault by the accused on the petitioner, his brother and his uncle.
An FIR was registered at Police Station Nissing, Karnal against six accused under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 325 and 506 IPC. The petitioner’s brother sustained “a fracture on the right parietal bone with underlying haemorrhagic contusion”.
Three medical opinions came into the case, and they did not agree:
| Source | Opinion |
|---|---|
| Neurosurgeon at a private hospital, who treated the injured (PW5) | The injury could have been dangerous to life |
| Medical Officer, Primary Health Centre, who examined him immediately (PW6) | Deferred the opinion on gravity to the treating surgeon |
| Medical Board, Government Medical College, Karnal — constituted at the instance of the accused during investigation | Injuries grievous but not dangerous to life |
Section 307 never entered the case. It is not among the sections in the FIR, and the Court records that it was “absent in the chargesheet itself”. It was the Medical Board’s opinion — obtained on the accused’s own application — that kept it out.
The application, and three refusals
After the prosecution witnesses had been examined, the petitioner applied to the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karnal to alter the charge to one under Section 307. The Magistrate dismissed it. A revision to the Sessions Court, Karnal was dismissed. A further revision to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was dismissed.
The High Court’s reasoning is recorded in a single sentence, and it is the sentence the Supreme Court took issue with:
“The High Court, in a revision filed, by the impugned order agreed with the order of the Magistrate on the ground that the Neurosurgeon was working in a private hospital which was superseded by the opinion of the Medical Board of the Government Medical College at Karnal.”
The law: grievousness is not an ingredient
“We are of the opinion that the grievousness of the injuries or the possibility of injury which could have led to death, is not a necessary ingredient to attract Section 307.”
The Court set out the structure of the offence:
“Hurt, grievous or simple, is not a precondition to attract Section 307, but, if there is a hurt, be it simple or grievous, and the act causing such hurt is with the intention or knowledge that such act could have caused death; making the perpetrator guilty of murder, then a graver punishment is provided.”
And, drawing on Kashiram:
“…to justify the conviction under Section 307, it would be sufficient if there is intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that there should be a bodily injury capable of causing death or even an injury in the nature of simple hurt.”
“The mere fact that the injury inflicted was simple or minor, will not by itself rule out the application of Section 307, since the determining question is the intention or knowledge.”
What the courts below got wrong
“The nature of the hurt on which the courts laboured in the impugned orders, according to us, though relevant cannot on that sole basis result in a finding of attempt to murder.”
Read that carefully, because it cuts both ways. The Court did not say the Medical Board was wrong, or that its opinion should have yielded to the private neurosurgeon’s. It said the whole inquiry into how bad the injury was is the wrong lens for Section 307 — whether it is being used to bring the section in or to keep it out.
The nuance that must not be lost
“Not an ingredient” is not the same as “irrelevant”, and the judgment is careful about this. Relying on Kanha and Jage Ram, the Court recorded that:
“…the absence of a fatal injury would not dislodge Section 307, but the nature or gravity of the injury and the nature of the weapon used could lead to an inference of intent and knowledge.”
So the correct proposition is this. Injury is evidence, not an element. The prosecution does not have to prove a life-threatening wound; but the wound, and the weapon that made it, remain among the most important circumstances from which intention is inferred. A defence that leads only with “the injury was simple” will fail. A defence that uses the injury and the weapon to show the absence of any intention to kill is doing exactly what the law contemplates.
The authorities
| Case | Citation | Proposition |
|---|---|---|
| State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kashiram | (2009) 4 SCC 26 | Principal authority. Intent plus an overt act suffices; no bodily injury capable of causing death, nor even simple hurt, is essential |
| State of M.P. v. Saleem alias Chamaru | (2005) 5 SCC 554 | No necessity for a bodily injury capable of causing death; a simple injury does not as a corollary mean absence of intention |
| Chimanbhai Jagabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat | (2009) 11 SCC 273 | The three ingredients — the overt act, the intention or knowledge, and the absence of excuse for incurring the risk |
| Pasupuleti Siva Ramakrishna Rao v. State of A.P. | (2014) 5 SCC 369 | The two limbs of the punishment — ten years for the intention alone, extending to life where hurt is caused |
| State of M.P. v. Kanha alias Omprakash | (2019) 3 SCC 605 | Absence of a fatal injury does not dislodge Section 307, but the gravity of the injury and the weapon used may found an inference of intent |
| Jage Ram v. State of Haryana | (2015) 11 SCC 366 |
So why did he lose?
Because he never said it in time. This is the passage that decided the case:
“No such case of an intention or knowledge as would attract Section 307 having been raised at the initial stage or at the stage of cognizance or when the evidence was being led; which the investigation also did not detect, the application made at the later stage, cannot be entertained and hence, the finding leading to rejection of incorporation of Section 307, is justified.”
The Court noted that the trial had proceeded substantially, and that at the time cognizance was taken the injured victim had not complained that Section 307 was missing from a chargesheet in which it was visibly absent. Both medical opinions — the neurosurgeon’s and the Board’s — had been on the record since the investigation. Nothing new had emerged. The petitioner had simply not taken the point when he should have, and then took it after the prosecution evidence was complete.
“The trial had proceeded substantially, and it was at a late stage, the prayer was made to bring in Section 307.”
The saver
The Court then left a door open, and it is worth quoting because it is the practical takeaway for anyone in the middle of a part-heard trial:
“However, we also make it clear that it is the Court’s prerogative to alter the charge at any time when the trial is continuing, provided there is sound and justifiable cause, as emanating from the evidence led before court.”
A party cannot resurrect at the fag end of the trial a case it never pleaded. But the court retains its own power to alter the charge whenever the evidence genuinely throws up the need — and the source of that need must be the evidence, not a change of mind.
A note for the careful reader: the judgment does not cite any statutory provision for the alteration of the charge. It refers to the application only by its annexure number. Section 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — now Section 239 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — is the provision that governs, but the Court does not say so, and we do not attribute it.
The same case under the new codes
The offences here are of the IPC era. For a matter arising after 1 July 2024, the equivalents are these.
| Offence | IPC, 1860 | BNS, 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Attempt to murder | s. 307 | s. 109 |
| Rioting | s. 147 | s. 191(2) |
| Rioting, armed with a deadly weapon | s. 148 | s. 191(3) |
| Unlawful assembly — common object | s. 149 | s. 190 |
| Voluntarily causing hurt | s. 323 | s. 115(2) |
| Voluntarily causing grievous hurt | s. 325 | s. 117(2) |
| Criminal intimidation | s. 506 | s. 351(2) and (3) |
| Court may alter charge | s. 216 Cr.P.C. | s. 239 BNSS |
The substance of Section 109 of the Sanhita reproduces Section 307 of the Code, including the two-limb structure the Court describes — up to ten years where the attempt alone is proved, extending to imprisonment for life where hurt is caused.
For the practitioner
If you act for the complainant
Plead intention from the first day. This case was lost at the police station, not in the Supreme Court. If the injury and the circumstances suggest an intention to kill, say so in the FIR, say so in the statement under Section 161, and object when the chargesheet omits Section 307 — at the stage of cognizance, in writing. A protest petition costs little. Silence at cognizance is what the Supreme Court held against this petitioner.
And do not be deterred by a Medical Board. A “grievous but not dangerous to life” opinion is not an answer to Section 307. It is one circumstance among several, and this judgment says so expressly.
If you defend
The Medical Board route worked here, but notice why it worked: it worked at the investigation stage, before the charge was framed, by preventing Section 307 from ever entering the chargesheet. That is the moment to move. Once the section is in, a favourable medical opinion is evidence going to intention — useful, but no longer decisive, and this judgment removes the argument that it is.
If a charge is sought to be altered mid-trial
Two questions now. First, was the case ever pleaded? If the material was always on the record and the point was never taken at investigation, cognizance or while evidence was led, the application is too late. Second, and separately, has the evidence thrown it up? If it has, the court may act of its own motion, and the lateness objection does not run against the court’s own power.
How much weight does this carry?
An honest answer, because it affects how you cite it.
The judgment is marked Reportable, which signals that the Court intended the discussion of Section 307 to be citable. But the case was decided on the lateness ground, which was a complete and independent basis for dismissal — the Court reached its conclusion despite accepting the petitioner’s legal argument. And it was a special leave petition dismissed without leave being granted; no appeal was ever constituted.
So the Section 307 proposition is, strictly, not what decided the case. That does not weaken the proposition, because the proposition is not new: it is the settled line from Kashiram, Saleem, Kanha and Jage Ram, each binding in its own right. Cite Kashiram and Saleem as the authority, and this judgment as a recent and reportable restatement of it, together with its disapproval of deciding Section 307 on the strength of a medical opinion alone.
What this judgment does not do
- It does not restore or add Section 307. The charge stands as it was.
- It does not set aside the order of the High Court. The result below was affirmed, on different reasoning.
- It does not hold that the Medical Board’s opinion was wrong, inadmissible, or wrongly preferred to the treating neurosurgeon’s.
- It does not lay down that an application to alter a charge can never be made late — only that one cannot be made on a case never pleaded, where nothing new has emerged.
Disclaimer: This post is a summary and analysis prepared for the information of readers and does not constitute legal advice. The quotations are taken from the judgment as published and should be verified against the certified copy before being relied on in any proceeding. The judgment does not record the FIR number or date, the weapon used, the case numbers or dates of the orders of the Magistrate, the Sessions Court or the High Court, or the statutory provision under which the application to alter the charge was made; none of those has been supplied here. Authorship of the judgment as between the two learned Judges is not recorded in the copy consulted and has not been attributed. The BNS and BNSS equivalents in the table above are provided for convenience of reference and form no part of the judgment, which was decided under the IPC. Lawizard.in accepts no responsibility for any action taken on the basis of this post.
Sources: Surender Kumar v. State of Haryana and Others, 2026 INSC 1006, Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 14611 of 2026, decided 8 September 2026 (Supreme Court of India); LiveLaw report, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 953; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kashiram, (2009) 4 SCC 26; State of M.P. v. Saleem alias Chamaru, (2005) 5 SCC 554; Chimanbhai Jagabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 11 SCC 273; Pasupuleti Siva Ramakrishna Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 369; State of M.P. v. Kanha alias Omprakash, (2019) 3 SCC 605; Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366; Indian Penal Code, 1860, sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 325 and 506; Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, sections 109, 115, 117, 190, 191 and 351; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 216; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, section 239.
