The Supreme Court has said, in terms, that the right to access and use the internet is a fundamental right of every individual — children included. The sentence sits in a 136-page order whose real business is something else: a national database of hashes and URLs of child sexual abuse material, two-hour reporting duties, and the threat of heavy fines for platforms that fail to act.
New Delhi: “We have no hesitation in saying that the right to access and use the internet is a fundamental right of every individual under Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.” That is paragraph 292 of the order of 15 October 2026 in Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2026 INSC 1149, passed by J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. The Court went on to say that children, “irrespective of their age”, enjoy the same right.
The reports are leading with that holding, and rightly. But it occupies Part E of the order — 24 short paragraphs (paragraphs 280 to 303) — and, on the face of the order, no law or proposal restricting children’s access was before the Court for decision. The Court raised the subject itself. The rest of the order is a detailed framework for detecting, removing and reporting child sexual exploitation and abuse material (CSEAM) that has received far less attention. This article takes the holding first, with its limits, and then the framework.
The order at a glance
| Case | Just Rights for Children Alliance & Anr. (applicants) v. S. Harish & Ors. (respondents). The Union of India appeared through the Solicitor General, Tushar Mehta (para 1) |
| Neutral citation | 2026 INSC 1149 (also reported as 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1063) |
| Proceeding | M.A. Nos. 2553–2554 of 2026 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 2161–2162 of 2024 — miscellaneous applications in the matter decided on 23 September 2024 (2024 INSC 716) |
| Bench | J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. Both sign; the order does not say who wrote it |
| Date | 15 October 2026 · Reportable · headed “Order” · 320 paragraphs over 136 pages |
| Earlier stages | Judgment of 23 September 2024 (2024 INSC 716); order of 14 August 2026, in which the Court recorded concern over “serious lapses” by platforms (para 2) |
| Provisions | Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution; Sections 15, 19, 20, 21, 43 and 44, POCSO Act, 2012; Rule 11, POCSO Rules, 2020; Sections 67B and 79, Information Technology Act, 2000; Rules 3, 3A and 4, IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, as amended |
| Result | No final relief. The Court sets out a framework and directs the Union, through the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) and the Ministry of Law and Justice, to act on it and to file an affidavit of progress. “Post it on 10.12.2026” (para 320) |
Read the judgment
Why the Court took this up
The 2024 judgment had dealt with the circulation of CSEAM on social media, including the sale of links to it so as to avoid the storage-based offences, and had held that platforms which fail to report such material to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the local police lose the protection of Section 79 of the IT Act (paras 3–8, quoting the 2024 judgment).
The Court says the response since then has been inadequate. Paragraph 11: “Despite more than two years having gone by since our judgment, it appears that there has been no progress worth the name.” Paragraph 15 adds that, for want of any earnest initiative by the regulators or the platforms, the Court is “left with no choice but to take matters in our own hands”. Paragraph 16 states the principle for everything that follows: “there can be no space for non-consensual sexually exploitative and abusive material on the internet”.
The immediate trigger was a news report placed before the Court by the applicants. The Court reproduces an excerpt attributed to “TTP”: of 84 advertisements that ran in India, 55 could be reported through Meta’s own system; for 43 of those the reply was that the ad “doesn’t go against our Advertising Standards”; 11 were told the content had already been removed; and for one there was no response yet (paras 130 and 182). The order does not name the publication. The Court itself is careful: “If true, we, prima-facie, find the same to be an egregious error” (para 135). These are allegations in a news report, not findings against any company.
The headline holding: Part E, paragraphs 280–303
The Court begins by noting “a growing yet short-lived tendency across the globe” to limit the access of children below a certain age to the internet, “more particularly to social media platforms”, in the name of safety (para 281). It says it gave this “anxious consideration” and decided “consciously not to endorse the same” (para 282). Then, in paragraph 292:
“In view of the foregoing, we have no hesitation in saying that the right to access and use the internet is a fundamental right of every individual under Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Our children, irrespective of their age enjoy the same rights, and to deny the same altogether would be as absurd as saying children below a certain age do not have a conscience worth protecting or a freedom of speech worth expressing. The safety of our children and their freedom are not at odds with each other. Our children are entitled to both.”
How the Court reached it
- The target of safety measures. Any measure must be “directed at the harmful material and those responsible for the same, and not at the children themselves” (para 284). Keeping the child off the internet because of the failures of wrongdoers and platforms “would be to mistake the victim for the problem” (para 285).
- The cost of enforcing an age limit. Such processes “inevitably, always require identifying and ascertaining the age of each and every user, continuous collection and monitoring of sensitive data and an overall disproportionate risk of misuse and surveillance, the kind which finds no place within the right to privacy of our people” (para 286).
- Article 19(1)(a). The freedom includes the right to know and to receive and impart information, citing Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161 (para 287). The internet is the “marketplace of ideas, creative expression and information”; for many children in remote areas it is “often the only source of learning and information”, and for children with special needs “often the only place where they are able to find company in others like them” (para 288).
- Precedent. Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637, a three-Judge Bench, held that speech and trade through the medium of the internet are protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g), but “refrained from expressing any view on whether the right to access the internet is, by itself, a fundamental right” (paras 289–290). The Court says the issue is nonetheless “no longer res-integra”, and rests on Pragya Prasun v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 599, a two-Judge Bench decision on digital KYC for persons with disabilities, which held the right to digital access to be “an intrinsic component” of Article 21 (para 291).
- Effectiveness. Children “do not cease to use the internet merely because the law prohibits them from doing so”; they move to unregulated platforms (para 294), and are less likely to tell a parent about an approach online for fear of reprisal (para 295). A blanket restriction is “nothing more than unproven measures of proven disproportionality”, and “[n]o jurisdiction has, so far, been able to demonstrate that children are any safer on account of such measures” (para 297).
Part E names no foreign law and cites no study for these propositions about other jurisdictions (paras 281, 293, 297).
What the Court still allows
The holding is not a bar on all age-based safeguards. Paragraph 299 says so: “this does not mean that there should be no age-based restrictions.” The Court points to a system that places greater emphasis on parental consent, guidance and oversight, with a dedicated “child mode” for such accounts (para 300). That may include private accounts by default, restrictions on contacts and messages from unknown adults, and moderation of advertising and content accessible to children, implemented “for pre-teens, with a reasonable and proportionate means to verify parental consent”. The modalities are left “to the wisdom of the Union of India” (para 301). The Union may also restrict children’s access to categories of content or services “that are inherently harmful to them, such as adult content websites etc.” (para 302). Paragraph 303 confines the hash and URL measures to CSEAM “alone”.
Three cautions before you cite paragraph 292
1. It states a right; it does not supply a test. The Court calls a blanket restriction disproportionate and approves “reasonable and proportionate” safeguards, but it does not say what a restriction on a child’s access must satisfy — whether Article 19(2), Article 21 proportionality, or something else. The next challenge will have to answer that.
2. It was not a decision on any ban. The Court was not asked to uphold or strike down an age limit, and it does not do either. It is a statement by a two-Judge Bench, in an order mainly about CSEAM, on a question that the three-Judge Bench in Anuradha Bhasin had left open. In our view, a two-Judge Bench cannot overrule a three-Judge Bench, but there is nothing to overrule here, since Anuradha Bhasin did not decide the point either way. Expect a future respondent to argue that paragraph 292 is not a binding ratio. The order also does not cite the Kerala High Court’s decision in Faheema Shirin R.K. v. State of Kerala (2019), which, as reported, treated access to the internet as part of the right to education and privacy under Article 21. That is the nearer earlier authority and is worth citing alongside paragraph 292.
3. “Verify parental consent” without verifying age? Paragraph 286 rejects any process that needs the age of “each and every user”. Paragraph 301 endorses “a reasonable and proportionate means to verify parental consent” for pre-teens. How a platform verifies a parent’s consent for a user it has not identified as a child is the question the Union will have to answer, and the Court leaves it open. This is our observation, not the Court’s. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, which the order does not mention, defines a child as a person under 18 and (Section 9) requires verifiable parental consent before processing a child’s data. On the reports we have seen, that provision is not yet in force; check the commencement notifications before relying on it.
Where it will be cited
Whether to restrict children’s use of social media is a live question. Australia’s minimum-age law for social media accounts has been in force since 10 December 2025. In India, press reports in 2025–26 have recorded a suggestion by the Madras High Court that something similar be considered, an announced intention in the Karnataka budget to bar under-16s from social media (reported as an announcement, not a law), and a Delhi High Court decision in August 2026 declining to entertain a PIL on the subject as a matter of policy. None of these is mentioned in the order, and we have not checked the primary documents for each; treat this paragraph as context and verify before citing.
On the text, paragraph 292 will be cited against any State measure that shuts children out of the internet altogether. It will be harder to cite against narrower measures: content-specific restrictions the Court itself permits (para 302), parental-consent regimes (paras 300–301), or institutional controls. The same order requires filters on devices and networks in schools, with “greater rigour” in hostels, child care institutions, and tuition and coaching centres (para 315(ix)).
The CSEAM framework, item by item
Paragraph 316 summarises the Court’s conclusions in ten numbered items. The Court’s verbs vary — “shall”, “must”, “expect”, “request”, “consider” — and the last column of the table below records which is used. Paragraphs 317–318 route implementation through the Union: it “shall formulate appropriate guidelines, Standard Operating Procedures and suitable amendments to the IT Act and the IT Rules, where necessary”.
| Topic | What the order says | Para / item | Nature |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hash and URL tools | The Union to file an affidavit on the tools intermediaries use now. Guidelines or an SOP for perceptual hash-matching and URL listing by all significant social media intermediaries, revised periodically by MeitY; IT Rules to be amended where necessary. A further affidavit on the feasibility of industry-wide use | 1A–1E; paras 25–50 | “Shall” — on the Union |
| National Hash & URL List Database | The Union “shall create” it, solely for detecting and removing CSEAM, either inside the Sahyog Portal or as a standalone repository. Entries only after multi-tier verification; the final call by “at least three trained human analysts”, acting independently; entries by encrypted channels and confined to the hash and/or URL, never the material | 2A–2F; paras 51–97 | “Shall” — on the Union |
| Known and unknown origin | A match against the database (“Known Origin”): the intermediary must “immediately disable and remove” without awaiting further verification. “Unknown Origin”: removal must be preceded by verification and due diligence under the IT Rules, followed by a report to the authorities and to the database body, which then assesses it for entry | 2G–2I | “Shall” / “must” — on intermediaries, once the system exists |
| Notice in place of removed material | A prominent notice saying whether the removal followed the intermediary’s own detection or a database match. It must not reproduce or describe the material, and the material and associated data must be preserved and reported | 3A–3B; para 92 | “Would be required” |
| Challenging a removal | Own detection: the intermediary’s grievance mechanism, then the Grievance Appellate Committee (Rules 3(2) and 3A). Database match: a complaint to the authority that maintains the database, under guidelines the Union is to frame | 4A–4B | Direction; Union to frame guidelines |
| Safeguards on the database | Signed findings for each entry; records of source, analysts and date; logging of every access; periodic independent audits, public at least in aggregate; prompt de-listing of wrong entries, with restoration of content on every platform; a grievance route to the database authority. Modalities are left to the Union | Para 96; para 97 | “Must be accompanied”; SOP to be framed |
| To whom CSEAM is reported | Under Rule 11 of the POCSO Rules: the Special Juvenile Police Unit, the local police and/or the cyber-crime portal. Unknown-origin removals also go to the database authority | 5A–5C | “Must” |
| Grievance access | A distinct, clearly labelled CSEAM category with a name that anyone can understand regardless of age or literacy, reachable within two steps of the content, profile, group or link, and uniform across intermediaries | 8A–8C | “Must”; Union “requested” to issue guidelines |
| Grievance officers | A dedicated officer or team for CSEAM (para 187). Trained officers; no CSEAM report disposed of without review by one; automated tools only for preliminary screening; written findings bearing the officer’s digital signature; adequate resources | 9A–9G; para 187 | “Must” |
| Transparency | Grievance officer details and the complaint mechanism to be displayed prominently (Rule 3(2)(a)) and kept up to date. The Union to file an affidavit on the extent of compliance and the action taken against defaulters | 7A–7C | “Must”; affidavit by the Union |
| Fines | The Union to “consider” a framework of exemplary monetary fines, scaled to gravity, duration, recurrence, and the size and turnover of the intermediary. Section 79 stays as a last resort | 10A–10B; paras 223–266 | “Consider” |
| Paywalled and subscription content | Intermediaries are put to “strict notice” to scrutinise it. Revenue from CSEAM or prohibited material hosted through a paywall “should be forfeited and disgorged”. The Union to frame guidelines on scrutiny and on moderating what children can access or subscribe to | 10C–10H; paras 267–279 | Notice; Union “requested” to frame guidelines and to consider disgorgement (para 279) |
CSEAM is wider than a picture
The most useful legal clarification in the order for practitioners may be this one. The Court’s concern is that platforms are treating the 2024 judgment as saying that nothing is CSEAM unless it shows a child. It suggests the advertisements in the news report were “possibly” held compliant because they “did not explicitly contain any sexually exploitive or abusive content” (para 134), and calls that, “[i]f true”, an “egregious error” (para 135).
The Court explains that the emphasis on visual depiction in the 2024 judgment was made “only in respect of the penal provisions under the POCSO Act”, because a penal statute is construed strictly and needs an actus reus (paras 137–139). The IT Act and Rules are different. They are partly regulatory and govern the conduct of intermediaries, so their obligations are “much broader in their sweep” (paras 140–141). Hence paragraph 155:
“For the purposes of the IT Act and the Rules thereunder, CSEAM encompasses every form of electronic material that is harmful to children, including any material having the propensity or likelihood to facilitate, propagate or enable their exploitation and abuse.”
Two consequences follow. First, “[a]n advertisement or promotion cannot escape the rigours of the IT Act and the IT Rules merely because it does not itself contain any depiction of a child” (para 161). Second, an advertisement that promotes a tool or application capable of manipulating photographs and videos of children into abusive material “facilitates the very creation of CSEAM”, and falls within Section 67B(d) of the IT Act and within Rule 3(1)(b) as content “harmful to child” (para 162). Advertisements that merely redirect users to sites where CSEAM is hosted are, the Court says, “in substance an advertisement of CSEAM itself” (para 163).
For grievance officers, item 9B of paragraph 316 requires the assessment to look at the content as a whole, including text, captions, keywords, links and the function of the tool or application being promoted.
The new clocks
The order is explicit that none of the existing timelines in the IT Rules was made specifically for CSEAM (para 106), and that no timeline exists at all for reporting CSEAM to the authorities under Rule 11 of the POCSO Rules (para 112). The two tables separate what the Court records as the present position from what it adds. Rule numbers and periods are as the order states them; check them against the current consolidated Rules.
Existing periods recorded in the order
| Situation | Period | Source and paragraph |
|---|---|---|
| Removal of unlawful content on a court order or reasoned intimation from the appropriate Government | 3 hours | Rule 3(1)(d); para 104 |
| Removal of sexually exploitative or abusive content, on a complaint by or on behalf of the individual depicted. The Court notes this does not squarely cover a report by a member of the public (paras 106–107) | 2 hours | Rule 3(2)(b); para 105 |
| Resolution of a complaint about Rule 3(1)(b) content, which includes CSEAM | 36 hours | Proviso to Rule 3(2)(a); paras 109, 172 |
| Resolution of an ordinary complaint | 7 days | Rule 3(2)(a); para 108 |
| Acknowledgement of a complaint | 24 hours | Rule 3(2)(a); para 183 |
| Reference number to track a complaint, and reasons “to the extent reasonable” | Significant social media intermediaries only | Rule 4(6); para 183 |
| Monthly review of the grievance mechanism | Monthly; significant social media intermediaries | Rule 4(1)(d); para 186 |
What paragraph 316 adds
| Situation | Period | Item |
|---|---|---|
| Report an unknown-origin removal made on a complaint, to the Rule 11 authorities and the database authority | Forthwith on resolution, and no later than 2 hours after it | 6A |
| Report an unknown-origin removal made on the intermediary’s own due diligence | 2 hours from removal | 6B |
| Report an unknown-origin removal made on a court order or reasoned intimation from the appropriate Government | 2 hours from removal | 6C |
| Remove material matching a database entry (known origin) | “Immediately”, without further verification | 2G |
| Report known-origin removals to the database authority | A consolidated report weekly | 5D, 6D |
| Acknowledge a CSEAM report, with a reference number; communicate the decision with reasons. The Court expects the Union to extend this to every intermediary by amending Rule 4(6) (item 9J) | 24 hours | 9H–9J |
| Publish a monthly compliance report with a separate CSEAM section, audited periodically and independently by an authority MeitY designates | Monthly | 9K–9L |
Note what the new periods are. The two-hour periods are periods for reporting an unknown-origin removal, not for the removal itself. The summary prescribes no new period for removal, apart from “immediately” for known-origin matches. Whether the new duties bind intermediaries now, or only after the Union frames the guidelines and amends the Rules, is the question the order leaves to the next stage, and its language is mixed (“must”, “shall”, “expect”).
Fines and disgorgement of paywall revenue
Part D is the Court’s answer to a problem it describes in paragraph 236: Section 79 of the IT Act “is too drastic to be invoked for every instance of non-compliance, and too remote to deter the same”, so “routine defaults go unchecked”. Paragraph 238 asks whether the IT Act should remain “a toothless tiger” and answers “an emphatic ‘no’”. What is needed, it says, is “a distinct set of consequences that are attracted by the default itself” (para 239). The order tabulates penalty regimes in several foreign jurisdictions before concluding that, for now, exemplary fines suffice, with Section 79 “would always be available as a last resort” (para 266).
Two points are easy to overstate in reporting. The Court does not impose any fine. It asks the Union to “consider” a framework (item 10A), with quantum set by gravity, duration, recurrence, size and turnover (item 10B). And it is the Union that must prescribe it.
On paywalled and subscription content, the Court describes a practice of “profiteering until prohibited” (para 272), puts all intermediaries “to strict notice” (para 275), and says that revenue from CSEAM or prohibited material circulated through a paywall “should be forfeited and disgorged”, in addition to any fine (para 273). Then, in paragraph 279, the Court words it as a request: the Union “is requested to also consider” whether penalties should include disgorgement. Revenue forfeiture is therefore a recommendation to the Union, not a direction.
Digital safety and sex education
Part F (paras 304–315) turns from intermediaries to schools and governments. The Court recalls its 2024 emphasis on age-appropriate sex education and on the duty of the appropriate Government and the Commissions under Sections 43 and 44 of POCSO to go beyond publicity (para 309), notes that more than two years have passed, and asks the Union what it has done (para 311). It calls digital safety and sex education “two sides of the same coin” (para 312). Paragraph 315 then lists sixteen measures that “must be undertaken” by the Union and State Governments, the Commissions, educational institutions and intermediaries. Among them:
- Teaching, from the primary stage and in an age-appropriate way, about the body, safe and unsafe touch, and consent, within a core curriculum developed by NCERT and the SCERTs (items (i) and (vii)).
- Teaching children to respect peers’ dignity, since “it is children themselves who capture, upload or circulate intimate or non-consensual images of their own peers, often without realising the gravity of what they do” (item (ii)).
- Displaying Child Helpline 1098, Cyber Crime Helpline 1930 and the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal in every classroom, hostel, library and computer laboratory, and on every school website (item (viii)).
- Filters on devices and networks in educational institutions, “in a reasonable and proportionate manner”, with greater rigour in hostels, child care institutions, and tuition and coaching centres (item (ix)).
- Training teachers on grooming, abuse and online harassment, on responding to a disclosure, and on the duty to report under Sections 19 and 21 of POCSO (item (x)).
- Regular awareness programmes for parents, including on parental controls and on monitoring without breeding mistrust (items (xi) and (xii)).
- On intermediaries: periodic reminders to children, cautionary prompts when a child tries to connect with an unknown adult, and warnings when a user searches for terms associated with CSEAM (item (xv)).
- Free counselling and therapy for victims for as long as necessary (item (xvi)).
The summary in paragraph 316 does not repeat the Part E holding or these Part F measures. If you cite them, cite paragraphs 292 and 315.
What this order does not decide
- It does not uphold or strike down any law, ban or age limit on children’s internet use. On its face, none was before the Court.
- It does not fix the test for a permissible restriction on a child’s access, beyond calling blanket restrictions disproportionate and approving “reasonable and proportionate” safeguards.
- It does not itself create the national database, impose any fine, or order any platform to disgorge revenue. It directs the Union to frame guidelines and amendments and asks it to consider fines and disgorgement.
- It does not amend the IT Rules. It records its expectation that the Union will extend Rule 4(6) to every intermediary for CSEAM complaints (item 9J).
- It makes no finding against Meta or any other platform. The news report is quoted “if true”.
- It does not say what “a reasonable and proportionate means to verify parental consent” is, or how it relates to the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, which it does not mention.
- It does not displace Section 79 of the IT Act, which it keeps “as a last resort” (para 266).
For the practitioner
Advising a platform or intermediary
- Map your grievance flow against items 7 to 9 of paragraph 316 now: a distinct CSEAM category within two steps, a trained dedicated officer or team, written findings with a digital signature, a 24-hour acknowledgement with a reference number, and a separate CSEAM section in the monthly report.
- Build the two-hour reporting step for unknown-origin removals, and the Rule 11 POCSO reporting channel to the Special Juvenile Police Unit, the local police or the cyber-crime portal. The 2024 judgment, quoted at paragraph 7, already held that reporting to the National Centre for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) alone is not enough.
- Review the “advertising standards” used by ad reviewers. Paragraphs 155 and 161–163 say an ad promoting a manipulation tool, or redirecting to a site that hosts CSEAM, is within the Act and Rules even if it shows no child.
- Treat paywalled and subscription content as expressly warned about: it must be scrutinised and kept away from children (paras 275–277).
Defending or challenging a restriction on children’s internet use
- Lead with paragraphs 284–286 and 292. Pair them with Anuradha Bhasin, Pragya Prasun and Faheema Shirin rather than leaning on paragraph 292 alone.
- Expect the answer that a narrower restriction is expressly preserved: content-specific limits (para 302), parental-consent and child-mode systems (paras 300–301), and school and hostel filters (para 315(ix)). Frame the argument as proportionality, which is the Court’s own vocabulary.
For a person or client whose content was removed
- Once the system exists, the route depends on how the removal was made: own detection goes to the intermediary and the Grievance Appellate Committee; a database match goes to the database authority (items 4A–4B). The notice displayed in place of the material is meant to tell you which (item 3B).
For schools, hostels, coaching centres and State authorities
- Paragraph 315 is expressed as a list of things that “must be undertaken”: curriculum, helpline displays, filters, teacher training, parent programmes and victim support.
Provisions considered
No Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, or Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita provision is involved, so there is no old and new numbering table.
| Provision | Subject | Where it appears |
|---|---|---|
| Articles 21 and 19(1)(a), Constitution | Right to access and use the internet | Paras 287–292 |
| Article 19(1)(g), Constitution | Trade through the medium of the internet (Anuradha Bhasin) | Para 289 |
| Articles 14, 19 and 21, Constitution | Constraint on guidelines for paywalled content | Para 278 |
| Section 15, POCSO Act | Storing child pornographic material, and failing to delete, destroy or report it | Paras 4, 99–100; item 5A |
| Sections 19, 20, 21, POCSO Act | Reporting of offences (s.19); the duty of media, studios, hotels and similar establishments to report (s.20); punishment for failure to report (s.21) | Paras 7, 99, 315(x) |
| Sections 43, 44, POCSO Act | Publicity of the Act; monitoring by the Commissions | Para 309 |
| Rule 11, POCSO Rules, 2020 | Reporting of material involving children to the SJPU, local police or cyber-crime portal | Paras 7, 112; items 5A–5B |
| Section 67B, IT Act, 2000 | Publishing or transmitting material depicting children in sexually explicit acts; sub-clause (b) covers advertising and promotion, sub-clause (d) facilitating abuse of children online | Paras 143–162 |
| Section 79, IT Act | Safe harbour; lost where due diligence, including reporting, fails | Paras 7–8, 236, 266 |
| Rules 3(1)(b), 3(1)(d), 3(2), 3A, 4(1)(d), 4(4), 4(6), IT Rules, 2021 (as amended) | Due diligence, grievance redressal, Grievance Appellate Committee, obligations of significant social media intermediaries | Paras 36–45, 104–109, 158–159, 172–187 |
Authorities
| Case | Citation | Used for |
|---|---|---|
| Just Rights for Children Alliance & Anr. v. S. Harish & Ors. | 2024 INSC 716 (judgment of 23 September 2024) | The earlier judgment: definition of CSEAM; Sections 15 and 67B; reporting duties; sex education; Section 79 |
| Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal | (1995) 2 SCC 161 | Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to know and to receive information |
| Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India | (2020) 3 SCC 637 | Internet speech and trade protected under Article 19(1)(a) and (g); standalone access left open |
| Pragya Prasun v. Union of India | 2025 INSC 599 | Digital access as an intrinsic component of Article 21 (digital KYC and persons with disabilities) |
| Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra | (2013) 5 SCC 546 | Cited in para 311 as having laid the same emphasis on sex education |
What the coverage gets wrong, or leaves out
- The title. The copy of the order we were given carries a file name ending “v-union-of-india”. The cause title is Just Rights for Children Alliance & Anr. v. S. Harish & Ors., and the Union appears as a party heard, through the Solicitor General. Press reports describe a different writ petition by the same organisation, W.P.(C) No. 1120 of 2026, on platforms contracting with minors without parental consent; do not confuse the two.
- The framework. The LiveLaw report we were sent covers the Article 21 holding and, as we read it, the national database; the reporting periods, the grievance-officer duties, the fines and the paywall disgorgement proposal are not in it.
- The holding’s reach. The holding should not be summarised as a ruling that age limits or bans are unconstitutional. The order says only that the Court “decided consciously not to endorse” such measures (para 282) and that a blanket restriction is “nothing more than unproven measures of proven disproportionality” (para 297).
- Directions or requests. Several items in the summary read like directions but are requests to the Union to consider or to frame guidelines (items 8C, 10A, 10G–10H; paras 278–279).
- A spelling. Law Trend’s Hindi report renders the party in Pragya Prasun as “Prajwal Prasoon”; the order reads Pragya Prasun & Ors. v. Union of India.
Notes on the order
- The document is headed “Order” but the Court refers to it as “this judgment” (for example, paras 303 and 317).
- The order is dated 15 October 2026; the digital signature stamp on the PDF reads 17 October 2026.
- The summary in paragraph 316 stops at item 10. Part E (Article 21) and Part F (education) are not summarised there.
- Paragraph 264 says the fines framework would be confined to duties “that relate to or aid in the removal of CSEAM”. Item 10A speaks of “any duties under the IT Act and the IT Rules”. The narrower reading follows the text of paragraph 264; the Union’s framework will decide.
- Paragraph 65 and item 2B say the final assessment is by “at least three” analysts; paragraph 96(i) says “two or three”.
- Paragraph 182 says the remaining complaints after the 43 “elicited no response at all”. The excerpt it quotes says 11 were told the content had already been removed and one had had no response yet.
- The excerpt is attributed to “TTP”, which appears from press reports to be the Tech Transparency Project; the order does not expand the abbreviation or name the publication.
Disclaimer: This post is a commentary prepared by Lawizard.in for information and study. It is not legal advice and no lawyer-client relationship arises from reading it. The text of the judgment is excluded from copyright infringement by Section 52(1)(q)(iv) of the Copyright Act, 1957; the analysis and arrangement are original to Lawizard. The observations on Faheema Shirin, on age and parental-consent verification, and on the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, and the wider-debate paragraph, are this writer’s own or drawn from secondary reports, and have not been considered by the Court. Rule numbers and periods are as the order records them. Verify against the order, the consolidated IT Rules and the bare Acts before citing.
Sources: order of the Supreme Court of India dated 15 October 2026 in Just Rights for Children Alliance & Anr. v. S. Harish & Ors., M.A. Nos. 2553-2554 of 2026 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 2161-2162 of 2024, 2026 INSC 1149 (signed copy); LiveLaw report; Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 INSC 716, as quoted in the order; Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Rules, 2020; Information Technology Act, 2000; Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, as amended (including by G.S.R. 120(E) of 10 February 2026); Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, Section 9.
