AIBE 19 (XIX) Question Paper Set A with Answers and Explanations - All 100 Questions, 7 Withdrawn and 3 Revised in the Final Key

Compiled and explained by Akinchan Aggarwal, Advocate — B.A. (Hons.) Gold Medalist, LL.B. (University Rank 2), LL.M. (Dispute Resolution), UGC–NET, Ph.D. (Pursuing)

This is the complete All India Bar Examination XIX (AIBE 19), Set Code A question paper — all 100 questions, with the answer to each one and a short explanation of why that answer is correct. The examination was conducted by the Bar Council of India on 22 December 2024.

One thing sets this paper apart from most AIBE papers, and it is the reason you should read the explanations rather than just the key: in the final answer key released on 6 March 2025, the BCI withdrew seven questions from Set A and revised the answer to three more. Those ten questions are flagged below, and in each case I have explained what went wrong with the question. That is far more useful to a future candidate than the answer itself, because it tells you exactly where the paper-setters slip — and those are the questions you should not lose sleep over in the hall.

What the withdrawals did to the marking.

With 7 questions dropped, AIBE 19 was ultimately marked out of 93, not 100. Every candidate received credit for the withdrawn questions. The revised qualifying marks were 42 out of 93 for General and OBC candidates (45%) and 37 out of 93 for SC, ST and persons with disabilities (40%).

So a candidate who attempted all 100 and got the seven flawed ones wrong lost nothing at all. This is worth internalising: on the AIBE, a question you cannot answer because the question itself is defective is not your problem. Mark it, move on, and spend the time on a question that is properly framed.

Paper at a Glance

Particulars	Details
Examination	All India Bar Examination XIX (AIBE 19)
Conducted by	Bar Council of India
Date of examination	22 December 2024
Set analysed here	Set Code A (sets B, C and D carry the same questions in a different order)
Questions / duration	100 multiple-choice questions, 3 hours 30 minutes, open book
Negative marking	None
Final answer key	Released 6 March 2025
Questions withdrawn (Set A)	Q4, Q5, Q14, Q25, Q52, Q57, Q69 — 7 questions
Answers revised (Set A)	Q13 (D → C), Q75 (C → A and C both), Q97 (A → D)
Final marking	Out of 93
Revised qualifying marks	General / OBC — 42/93; SC / ST / PwD — 37/93

Subject-wise Weightage in AIBE 19 (Set A)

Before the questions themselves, here is where the 100 marks actually sat. If you are preparing for a forthcoming AIBE, this table should decide how you allocate your reading time.

Subject	Question numbers	Marks
Constitutional Law	1–10	10
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS)	19–28	10
Code of Civil Procedure	29–38	10
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)	11–18	8
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (Evidence)	39–46	8
Family Law (Hindu and Muslim)	51–58	8
Public Interest Litigation and Administrative Law	59–65	7
Law of Torts	80–84	5
Alternative Dispute Resolution	47–50	4
Professional Ethics and Bar Council Rules	66–69	4
Labour and Industrial Law	76–79	4
Taxation Law	85–88	4
Specific Relief and Transfer of Property	91, 92, 94, 95	4
Law of Contract	89, 90, 96	3
Company Law	70, 71	2
Environmental Law	72, 73	2
Cyber Law and Information Technology Act	74, 75	2
Land Acquisition	97, 98	2
Intellectual Property	99, 100	2
Negotiable Instruments Act	93	1

Read that table again. The three procedural codes — BNSS, CPC and the Evidence Adhiniyam — together carried 28 marks. Add the BNS and you are at 36. Constitutional Law adds another 10.

Nearly half the paper sat in five subjects, and almost all of it was section-number recall. A candidate who spends a fortnight memorising the section numbering of the three new criminal codes and the CPC will clear this paper comfortably, whatever else they do or do not know.

AIBE 19 Set A — Answer Key at a Glance

The full final key, incorporating the BCI's revisions. W marks a withdrawn question; the answer shown beside it is the substantively correct one, given for study purposes only.

Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans	Q	Ans
1	B	21	C	41	B	61	D	81	B
2	D	22	C	42	A	62	A	82	A
3	A	23	D	43	B	63	C	83	C
4 W	–	24	A	44	B	64	A	84	D
5 W	B	25 W	D	45	C	65	D	85	A
6	A	26	C	46	D	66	D	86	B
7	C	27	D	47	B	67	A	87	D
8	B	28	C	48	A	68	C	88	A
9	C	29	B	49	C	69 W	B	89	D
10	A	30	A	50	B	70	C	90	B
11	C	31	A	51	D	71	B	91	C
12	C	32	D	52 W	C	72	A	92	B
13 ★	C	33	B	53	B	73	D	93	B
14 W	B	34	D	54	D	74	B	94	B
15	B	35	B	55	C	75 ★	A & C	95	D
16	B	36	A	56	C	76	D	96	A
17	B	37	A	57 W	C	77	C	97 ★	D
18	D	38	B	58	D	78	B	98	C
19	B	39	B	59	B	79	A	99	A
20	B	40	C	60	C	80	B	100	C

W = question withdrawn by the BCI in the final key (full marks awarded to all candidates). ★ = answer revised in the final key.

Part I — Constitutional Law (Questions 1 to 10)

Q1. In which case was a registered society held to be an "authority" for the purpose of Article 12?

(A) Som Prakash v. Union of India  •  (B) Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib  •  (C) Sukhdev v. Bhagatram  •  (D) R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority

✔ (B) Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib

The Regional Engineering College, Srinagar was run by a society registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Registration of Societies Act. The Court held that the form in which a body is clothed is irrelevant — what matters is whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the State. R.D. Shetty laid down the tests, but it concerned a statutory corporation; Sukhdev Singh concerned statutory corporations too; Som Prakash concerned a government company. Only Ajay Hasia involved a registered society, which is what the question asks.

Q2. In which case did the Supreme Court of India hold that fundamental rights cannot be waived?

(A) Gopalan v. State of Madras  •  (B) Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar  •  (C) Golaknath v. State of Punjab  •  (D) Basheshar Nath v. I.T. Commissioner

✔ (D) Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax

The Court held that a fundamental right cannot be waived even by the person for whose benefit it exists, because these rights are not conferred merely for individual advantage — they embody a matter of public policy. The assessee had settled with the Income Tax Investigation Commission and was held not to have thereby given up his Article 14 challenge.

Q3. By which Constitutional Amendment was clause (4B) inserted into Article 16?

(A) 81st  •  (B) 91st  •  (C) 77th  •  (D) 85th

✔ (A) 81st Amendment Act, 2000

Article 16(4B) permits unfilled reserved vacancies of one year to be carried forward to succeeding years as a separate class, and expressly takes that carried-forward backlog outside the 50% ceiling. Keep the cluster straight: the 77th inserted 16(4A) (reservation in promotion), the 81st inserted 16(4B) (carry-forward), and the 85th amended 16(4A) to add consequential seniority.

Q4. WITHDRAWN Which of the following statements is correct about the 106th Constitutional Amendment Act? (i) It introduces Article 239A reserving seats for women in the Delhi legislative assembly; (ii) It introduces Article 338 providing reservation of seats for women in the House of the People; (iii) It adds Article 334A, under which the amendment commences after the first census taken after the Act's commencement; (iv) The above shall cease to have effect on the expiration of 15 years from such commencement.

(A) (i), (ii) & (iii)  •  (B) (i), (iii) & (iv)  •  (C) (ii), (iii) & (iv)  •  (D) All of these

Withdrawn — no option is correct

This one deserved to go. The 106th Amendment (the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam, 2023) inserted Articles 330A, 332A and 334A and amended Article 239AA. Statement (i) is wrong because Delhi reservation came through a proviso to Article 239AA(2)(b), not "Article 239A". Statement (ii) is plainly wrong — Article 338 is the National Commission for Scheduled Castes; reservation for women in the Lok Sabha is Article 330A. Only (iii) and (iv) are accurate, and no option offered (iii) and (iv) alone. The BCI withdrew it, correctly.

Q5. WITHDRAWN Parliament enacts a "Fair Housing Act, 2024" with three provisions. A citizen challenges Section 10 as violating the right to privacy under Article 21. The Supreme Court declares Section 10 unconstitutional but upholds the other provisions. What principle did the court apply?

(A) Doctrine of Eclipse  •  (B) Doctrine of Severability  •  (C) Doctrine of Basic Structure  •  (D) Doctrine of Colourable Legislation

✔ (B) Doctrine of Severability — but the question was withdrawn

Substantively the answer is straightforward: Article 13 speaks of a law being void "to the extent of the inconsistency", and where the offending provision can be cut out without destroying the scheme, only that provision falls (R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India). The eclipse doctrine applies to pre-Constitution laws that lie dormant, not to a 2024 statute. Why it was withdrawn is not obvious from the face of the question; my own reading is that the Hindi and English versions of the fact pattern did not line up, which is the usual reason a well-framed question gets dropped.

Q6. The reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India relating to the accounts of a State shall be submitted to whom?

(A) Governor  •  (B) Committee on Public Undertakings  •  (C) Estimates Committee  •  (D) Public Accounts Committee

✔ (A) Governor

Article 151(2): the CAG's reports on State accounts go to the Governor, who causes them to be laid before the State Legislature. The Public Accounts Committee examines the report afterwards — it is not the recipient. The parallel provision for the Union is Article 151(1), where the report goes to the President.

Q7. Which Article of the Constitution declares that the Supreme Court shall be a court of record?

(A) Article 119  •  (B) Article 111  •  (C) Article 129  •  (D) Article 135

✔ (C) Article 129

Article 129 makes the Supreme Court a court of record with all the powers of such a court, including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The corresponding provision for High Courts is Article 215. Note that this contempt power is constitutional, not statutory — the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 regulates its exercise but does not create it.

Q8. Which Article deals with the powers, privileges and immunities of Parliament and its members?

(A) 107  •  (B) 105  •  (C) 108  •  (D) 102

✔ (B) Article 105

Article 105 guarantees freedom of speech in Parliament and immunity from court proceedings in respect of anything said or any vote given. Article 194 is its State counterpart. The distractors: 102 is disqualification of members, 107 is the procedure for introducing Bills, and 108 is the joint sitting.

Q9. Which Constitutional Amendment Act inserted provisions related to GST?

(A) 99th  •  (B) 100th  •  (C) 101st  •  (D) 102nd

✔ (C) 101st Amendment Act, 2016

It inserted Article 246A (concurrent taxing power over goods and services), Article 269A (inter-State supply) and Article 279A (the GST Council). Remember the neighbours: the 99th created the NJAC and was struck down; the 100th gave effect to the India–Bangladesh land boundary agreement; the 102nd gave constitutional status to the National Commission for Backward Classes.

Q10. Who can initiate impeachment proceedings against the President of India?

(A) Either House of Parliament  •  (B) Supreme Court  •  (C) Only Lok Sabha  •  (D) Rajya Sabha

✔ (A) Either House of Parliament

Article 61: the charge may be preferred by either House, on a resolution passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of that House, after 14 days' written notice signed by at least one-fourth of the members. The other House then investigates. This is deliberately symmetrical — contrast the removal of a Judge under Article 124(4), which requires an address by both Houses in the same session.

Part II — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Questions 11 to 18)

Q11. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 considers force to be "criminal force":

(A) When it is used unintentionally  •  (B) When intentionally uses force only  •  (C) When it is used intentionally without consent, causing injury, fear or annoyance  •  (D) When it is used in self-defence

✔ (C)

Section 129 BNS (formerly Section 350 IPC) requires four things together: force used intentionally, without consent, to commit an offence or with intent or knowledge that it is likely to cause injury, fear or annoyance. Mere intentional use of force is not enough — a surgeon operating with consent uses force intentionally and commits nothing.

Q12. Under Section 182(1) BNS, what is the maximum fine for making or using a document that resembles a currency note or bank note?

(A) One hundred rupees  •  (B) Five hundred rupees  •  (C) Three hundred rupees  •  (D) One thousand rupees

✔ (C) Three hundred rupees

This is a pure "what changed" question and a good example of why you cannot answer the new codes from IPC memory. Section 489E IPC carried a fine of up to one hundred rupees; Section 182(1) BNS raised it to three hundred. Sub-section (2), which punishes refusal to disclose who printed the document, went from ₹200 to ₹600.

Q13. ANSWER REVISED Under the BNS, 2023, the right of private defence of property extends to voluntarily causing death in which of the following offences? (1) Robbery; (2) House-breaking after sunset; (3) Theft, mischief or house trespass.

(A) (1) only  •  (B) (1) and (3) both  •  (C) (1) and (2) both  •  (D) (1), (2) and (3)

✔ (C) — revised from (D) in the final key

This revision is legally sound and worth understanding properly. Section 35 BNS (formerly Section 103 IPC) lists four situations in which the right of private defence of property extends to causing death: robbery; house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise; mischief by fire to a dwelling or place used as a place for custody of property; and theft, mischief or house trespass in circumstances that reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence. Item (3) in the question drops that qualifying condition entirely. Bare theft, unqualified, never justifies killing. The provisional key marked (D); the final key correctly restricted it to (C).

Q14. WITHDRAWN Rajesh strikes Sunil with a heavy iron rod, fracturing his arm. The medical report confirms grievous hurt. Which offence has Rajesh committed?

(A) Simple hurt under Section 323 IPC  •  (B) Voluntarily causing grievous hurt under Section 325 IPC  •  (C) Voluntarily causing hurt under Section 324 IPC  •  (D) Attempt to commit culpable homicide under Section 308 IPC

Withdrawn

The reason is on the face of the options: every option cites the IPC, which stood repealed by the time of this examination. On the facts, (B) is right — a fracture is expressly grievous hurt, and the correct provision today is Section 117(2) BNS (voluntarily causing grievous hurt), the successor to Section 325 IPC. A question that forces a candidate to answer under a dead statute cannot stand, and the BCI dropped it.

Q15. Amit attacks Vijay with a knife; Vijay dies on the spot. Amit acted with knowledge that his act was likely to cause death, but there is no evidence of premeditation or intent to murder. Which offence?

(A) Murder under Section 302 IPC  •  (B) Culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC  •  (C) Causing death by negligence under Section 304A IPC  •  (D) Voluntarily causing grievous hurt under Section 325 IPC

✔ (B)

The distinguishing line is the degree of mental element. Where the accused acts with knowledge that death is likely but without the intention to cause death or the specific injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence falls in Part II of Section 304 IPC — now Section 105 BNS. Negligence under 304A (now Section 106 BNS) is out entirely: a deliberate knife attack is not negligence. Note the same IPC-citation defect as Q14, but this one survived.

Q16. Amit and Rani force open a house door at night intending to steal, but flee empty-handed when the owner arrives. Which offence under the BNS?

(A) Attempt to commit theft  •  (B) House trespass with intent to commit theft  •  (C) Attempt to commit robbery  •  (D) Burglary

✔ (B)

Two points. First, "burglary" is an English law term with no place in Indian criminal law — option (D) is a trap for candidates trained on foreign textbooks. The Indian equivalent is house-breaking. Second, the offence was complete the moment they entered: forcing the door and entering with intent to commit theft is house-breaking by night under Sections 331–332 BNS, and it does not matter that nothing was taken. There is no need to fall back on an inchoate "attempt" charge when a completed offence is already made out.

Q17. Punishment for rape where the victim is a woman below the age of 16 or 12 is contained in which section of the BNS?

(A) 64  •  (B) 65  •  (C) 63  •  (D) 72

✔ (B) Section 65

The cluster runs: Section 63 defines rape; Section 64 is the general punishment; Section 65 is the aggravated punishment where the victim is under 16 (sub-section 1, minimum 20 years) or under 12 (sub-section 2, minimum 20 years extending to life meaning natural life, or death). Section 72 punishes disclosure of the victim's identity.

Q18. A new offence of "snatching" has been introduced by the BNS. Which section defines it?

(A) 308  •  (B) 303  •  (C) 305  •  (D) 304

✔ (D) Section 304

Snatching is genuinely new — the IPC had no such offence, and chain-snatching had to be prosecuted as theft or robbery depending on the force used. Section 304(1) BNS defines it as theft where the offender suddenly or quickly or forcibly seizes or secures or grabs or takes away movable property from a person or their possession; sub-section (2) prescribes up to three years and fine. The neighbours: 303 theft, 305 theft in a dwelling or means of transport, 308 extortion.

Part III — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Questions 19 to 28)

Q19. A police officer receives a complaint that Raju was involved in a bank robbery and hid the property on his farm, supported by two villagers. He may arrest Raju without warrant when: (1) Raju commits a non-cognizable offence in his presence; (2) a reasonable complaint and strong suspicion exist from the villagers' testimony; (3) Raju tries to escape; (4) to prevent Raju from inducing, threatening or promising any person acquainted with the facts.

(A) (1) and (3)  •  (B) (2) and (4)  •  (C) Only (4)  •  (D) Only (2)

✔ (B) (2) and (4)

Section 35 BNSS is the arrest-without-warrant provision. Statement (1) is wrong on its face — the power arises for cognizable offences, not non-cognizable. Statement (3) is too narrow: attempting to escape is one ground among several, not the only one. Statement (2) tracks Section 35(1)(b) (reasonable complaint, credible information or reasonable suspicion of a cognizable offence punishable with less than seven years), and statement (4) tracks the sub-clause permitting arrest to prevent tampering with witnesses. Read Section 35(1)(b)(ii) closely — it is the most examined clause in the BNSS.

Q20. The BNSS introduced registration of an FIR for a cognizable offence irrespective of the area where it was committed. This FIR is known as:

(A) NCR  •  (B) Zero FIR  •  (C) False FIR  •  (D) Counter FIR

✔ (B) Zero FIR

Section 173(1) BNSS gives Zero FIR statutory recognition for the first time. Previously it existed only through Supreme Court directions and Home Ministry advisories. It is registered without a regular serial number (hence "zero") and transferred to the police station having jurisdiction. Section 173 also permits registration by electronic communication, which is the other major change.

Q21. The BNSS mandates a forensic team to visit crime scenes for offences punishable with imprisonment of at least how many years?

(A) 2  •  (B) 4  •  (C) 7  •  (D) 5

✔ (C) 7 years

Section 176(3) BNSS makes forensic examination of the scene compulsory where the offence is punishable with seven years or more, and requires the process to be videographed. This is one of the genuinely significant reforms in the new Code. The "seven years" threshold recurs across the BNSS — it is also the line for mandatory notice under Section 35(3) and for the supply of a copy of the police report.

Q22. Which section of the BNSS allows trials in absentia of proclaimed offenders?

(A) 251  •  (B) 349  •  (C) 356  •  (D) 366

✔ (C) Section 356

Section 356 BNSS is entirely new — the CrPC had no provision for trying an absconder in his absence. The court must first declare the accused a proclaimed offender, wait 90 days from framing of charge, record reasons in writing, and ensure legal representation at State expense. The judgment is pronounced and the sentence recorded even though the accused is absent.

Q23. Which section of the BNSS facilitates trials and proceedings in electronic mode?

(A) 532  •  (B) 330  •  (C) 430  •  (D) 530

✔ (D) Section 530

Section 530 is a sweeping enabling provision: all trials, inquiries and proceedings, including the issue and service of summons, the examination of complainants and witnesses, the recording of evidence, and appellate proceedings, may be held in electronic mode by audio-video electronic means. Note carefully that the BNSS has only 531 sections — so option (A), Section 532, does not exist. Eliminating impossible section numbers is a quick way to narrow these questions.

Q24. Which section of the BNSS repeals the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?

(A) 531  •  (B) 101  •  (C) 200  •  (D) 1

✔ (A) Section 531

Section 531 is the last section of the BNSS and contains the repeal and savings clause. Critically, sub-section (2)(a) preserves all appeals, applications, trials, inquiries and investigations pending immediately before the commencement — those continue under the old CrPC as if it had not been repealed. This transitional rule is why the CrPC will remain live law in Indian courts for years yet.

Q25. WITHDRAWN Which section mandates the State Government to prepare and notify a witness protection scheme?

(A) 98  •  (B) 198  •  (C) 298  •  (D) 398

✔ (D) Section 398 BNSS — but the question was withdrawn

Section 398 BNSS statutorily obliges every State Government to prepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme, giving legislative form to what the Supreme Court had directed in Mahender Chawla v. Union of India (2018). The substantive answer is not in doubt; the withdrawal appears to be down to the framing of the question rather than the law.

Q26. Which section of the BNSS mandates a designated police officer in each district and police station to provide information about arrested individuals to the public?

(A) 25  •  (B) 35  •  (C) 37  •  (D) 45

✔ (C) Section 37

Section 37 BNSS requires every State to designate a police officer in each district and each police station (not below the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector) responsible for maintaining information about arrested persons, and to prominently display that information, including digitally, in every police station and district headquarters. It gives statutory teeth to the D.K. Basu directions. Do not confuse it with Section 35 (arrest without warrant), the neighbouring and more famous provision.

Q27. Which section of the BNSS introduces provisions for identifying, attaching and forfeiting the property of proclaimed offenders located outside India?

(A) 74  •  (B) 76  •  (C) 84  •  (D) 86

✔ (D) Section 86

Section 86 is new. Where a proclamation has been issued under Section 84, the Court may on the police officer's written request direct the initiation of a request for assistance from a court or authority in a contracting State to identify, attach and forfeit property belonging to the proclaimed person situated abroad. Section 85 deals with attachment of property within India; Section 86 extends the reach outside it.

Q28. Which section of the BNSS places restrictions on adjournment of trials?

(A) 146  •  (B) 246  •  (C) 346  •  (D) 356

✔ (C) Section 346

Section 346 BNSS is the successor to Section 309 CrPC, and it tightens the screws: no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party where the circumstances are within that party's control, and a maximum of two adjournments may be granted to any one party during a hearing, each for reasons recorded in writing. Do not confuse it with Section 356, which is trial in absentia.

Part IV — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Questions 29 to 38)

Q29. A suit is pending in District Court A. Meera seeks its transfer to District Court B alleging bias; Ravi objects. Who has authority to decide whether the suit can be transferred?

(A) District Court A where the suit is pending  •  (B) The High Court or the Supreme Court  •  (C) The Civil Judge in District Court B  •  (D) A committee of local advocates

✔ (B)

The transfer is from one district to another, so it crosses the territorial limits of a single District Court. Section 22 read with Section 23(2) CPC directs the application to the High Court where the two courts are subordinate to different District Courts; Section 25 empowers the Supreme Court to transfer between States. A court cannot decide the question of its own bias — that is the whole point of the provision, and it disposes of option (A).

Q30. Neha asks that Seema, allegedly liable for the debt, be added to Maya's recovery suit. Maya objects. Court A decides Seema should be included as a defendant. Which principle of the CPC applies?

(A) Order 1 Rule 10 — joinder and substitution of parties  •  (B) Order 7 Rule 11 — rejection of plaint  •  (C) Order 5 — service of summons  •  (D) Order 6 Rule 17 — amendment of pleadings

✔ (A) Order 1 Rule 10

Order 1 Rule 10(2) empowers the court, at any stage and whether on application or of its own motion, to add any person whose presence is necessary to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon all the questions involved. The plaintiff is normally dominus litis and chooses whom to sue, but that choice yields where the added party is a necessary party. Order 6 Rule 17 is a distractor — adding a party is not the same as amending a pleading.

Q31. Which section of the CPC allows appeal from original decrees?

(A) Section 96  •  (B) Section 100  •  (C) Section 115  •  (D) Section 104

✔ (A) Section 96

Section 96 is the first appeal, and it lies on both facts and law. Section 100 is the second appeal, confined to a substantial question of law. Section 104 provides appeals from orders, and Section 115 is revision. Note Section 96(3): no appeal lies from a decree passed with the consent of parties.

Q32. Under the CPC, what is the maximum time limit for filing a written statement in a suit?

(A) 30 days  •  (B) 60 days  •  (C) 120 days  •  (D) 90 days

✔ (D) 90 days

Order VIII Rule 1 CPC requires the written statement within 30 days of service of summons, extendable by the court for recorded reasons to a maximum of 90 days. Option (C) is the deliberate trap: 120 days is the outer limit under the proviso inserted by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and that limit is mandatory and applies only to commercial disputes. The question asks about the CPC generally, so 90 days is the answer.

Q33. Which section of the CPC exempts the President of India and State Governors from personal appearance in court?

(A) Section 132  •  (B) Section 133  •  (C) Section 128  •  (D) Section 130

✔ (B) Section 133

Section 133 lists the persons exempt from personal appearance — the President, the Vice-President, the Speaker of the House of the People, Union Ministers, Judges of the Supreme Court, State Governors, Chief Ministers and Speakers of Legislative Assemblies, among others. Section 132, the neighbouring provision, exempts women who according to the customs and manners of the country ought not to be compelled to appear in public.

Q34. What is the term used for a court's power to transfer a case from one court to another under the CPC?

(A) Res judicata  •  (B) Reference  •  (C) Review  •  (D) Transfer of suits

✔ (D) Transfer of suits

A giveaway question, but it is worth keeping the three "R"s of the CPC distinct because they are examined constantly. Reference (Section 113) is a subordinate court referring a question of law to the High Court. Review (Section 114, Order 47) is the same court reconsidering its own decree. Revision (Section 115) is the High Court correcting a jurisdictional error. Res judicata (Section 11) is none of these.

Q35. Under which Order of the CPC is the procedure for summary suits provided?

(A) Order XXXV  •  (B) Order XXXVII  •  (C) Order XXXIV  •  (D) Order XXXVI

✔ (B) Order XXXVII

Order XXXVII applies to suits on bills of exchange, hundis and promissory notes, and to suits for a liquidated demand in money arising on a written contract, an enactment, or a guarantee. Its defining feature is that the defendant has no right to defend — he must apply for leave to defend within ten days of service of the summons for judgment, and the court grants leave only if a triable issue is disclosed. The neighbours: Order XXXIV is suits relating to mortgages, XXXV interpleader, XXXVI special case.

Q36. Which section of the CPC deals with res judicata?

(A) Section 11  •  (B) Section 10  •  (C) Section 12  •  (D) Section 9

✔ (A) Section 11

Keep the sequence straight, because all four options are live provisions. Section 9 — courts to try all civil suits unless barred. Section 10 — res sub judice, stay of a later suit where the matter is already directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit. Section 11 — res judicata, bar on retrying a matter already finally decided. Section 12 — bar to further suit where a plaintiff is precluded by rules from instituting a further suit.

Q37. Section ________ of the CPC provides for an interpleader suit.

(A) Section 88  •  (B) Section 89  •  (C) Section 92  •  (D) Section 86

✔ (A) Section 88

An interpleader suit is filed by a person who holds property but claims no interest in it, and is faced with two or more rival claimants — a bank holding a disputed deposit, for instance. Section 88 read with Order XXXV lets that stakeholder bring the claimants before the court to fight it out among themselves. Section 89 is settlement outside court (arbitration, conciliation, Lok Adalat, mediation), Section 92 is suits relating to public charitable trusts, and Section 86 concerns suits against foreign rulers and ambassadors.

Q38. Which section of the CPC provides for the payment of compensatory costs?

(A) Section 35  •  (B) Section 35(A)  •  (C) Section 35(B)  •  (D) Section 36

✔ (B) Section 35A

Section 35A allows compensatory costs where a claim or defence is false or vexatious to the knowledge of the party raising it, subject to a ceiling of ₹3,000 or the pecuniary limits of the court's jurisdiction, whichever is less. Section 35 is ordinary costs in the discretion of the court; Section 35B is costs for causing delay; Section 36 applies the execution provisions to orders.

Part V — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Questions 39 to 46)

Q39. Which word is inserted in Section 22 of the BSA that was not present in Section 24 of the Evidence Act?

(A) Inducement  •  (B) Coercion  •  (C) Threat  •  (D) Promise

✔ (B) Coercion

Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 rendered a confession irrelevant if caused by inducement, threat or promise. Section 22 BSA adds a fourth: coercion. The addition is not cosmetic — coercion is a wider concept than threat and covers physical compulsion that falls short of an articulated threat. This is precisely the sort of one-word amendment the AIBE loves, and it cannot be answered by anyone relying on Evidence Act memory.

Q40. Existence of course of business, when relevant, is discussed in which section of the BSA, 2023?

(A) Section 12  •  (B) Section 13  •  (C) Section 14  •  (D) Section 15

✔ (C) Section 14

Section 14 BSA carries forward Section 16 of the Evidence Act: when there is a question whether a particular act was done, the existence of any course of business according to which it naturally would have been done is a relevant fact. The classic illustration is the posting of a letter — proof that a letter was placed in the office's outgoing mail in the usual course makes it relevant that it was posted. The relevancy chapter runs two sections behind the old Act from Section 6 IEA onward, which is a useful conversion rule to carry into the hall.

Q41. A stolen laptop is recovered from a location frequented by Rajesh, with his fingerprints on it. Under the BSA, 2023, how should the court treat this evidence?

(A) Conclusive proof of guilt  •  (B) Circumstantial evidence to be considered with other evidence, not proof of guilt by itself  •  (C) Inadmissible for want of a search warrant  •  (D) Fingerprints must be verified by two independent experts

✔ (B)

Three propositions are worth taking away. First, recovery and fingerprints are circumstantial, and circumstantial evidence convicts only where the chain is complete and points exclusively to guilt (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra). Second, Indian law has no exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence — irregularity in search affects weight, not admissibility, so (C) is wrong. Third, there is no statutory requirement of two forensic experts, which disposes of (D).

Q42. Where a document is executed in several parts — printing, lithography, photography, video recording, or a computer resource as electronic or digital records — the BSA classifies each part as:

(A) Primary evidence  •  (B) Secondary evidence  •  (C) Circumstantial evidence  •  (D) Scientific evidence

✔ (A) Primary evidence

Section 57 BSA and its Explanations. Where a document is executed in several parts, each part is primary evidence of the document; where it is executed in counterpart, each counterpart is primary evidence against the party executing it; and where a number of documents are made by one uniform process, each is primary evidence of the contents of the rest. The BSA extends this expressly to electronic and digital records, which the 1872 Act did not.

Q43. Which section of the BSA provides that no court shall require any communication between the Ministers and the President of India to be produced before it?

(A) 65  •  (B) 165  •  (C) 268  •  (D) 168

✔ (B) Section 165

Section 165 BSA carries the production-of-documents provision from Section 162 of the Evidence Act, but adds a new proviso: no Court shall require any communication between the Ministers and the President of India to be produced before it. This is the evidentiary counterpart of Article 74(2) of the Constitution. Note also that the BSA has 170 sections in total, which immediately rules out option (C).

Q44. According to Section 46 of the BSA, when is character evidence relevant in civil cases?

(A) Always relevant to prove conduct  •  (B) Only when related to other relevant facts  •  (C) Never relevant  •  (D) Only in criminal cases

✔ (B)

Section 46 BSA (Section 52 of the old Act) provides that in civil cases the fact that a person's character is such as to render probable or improbable any conduct imputed to him is irrelevant, except in so far as such character appears from facts otherwise relevant. That exception is the whole of option (B). Two qualifications to keep in mind: character is always relevant where it is itself in issue (defamation), and character affecting damages is separately relevant.

Q45. Under Section 78(2) of the BSA, the presumption about an officer signing or certifying a document is:

(A) The signature is assumed to be forgery  •  (B) The officer did not hold the claimed character at the time of signing  •  (C) The officer held the official character claimed when signing or certifying  •  (D) Authenticity is independent of official character

✔ (C)

The court shall presume that the officer by whom the document purports to be signed or certified held the official character which he claims in the document. Options (A) and (B) invert the presumption, which is the trap: presumptions of regularity in the law of evidence run in favour of official acts, not against them. This is a rebuttable presumption under the "shall presume" category, not conclusive proof.

Q46. Under Section 146 of the BSA, when are leading questions permissible?

(A) Always allowed in examination-in-chief without restriction  •  (B) Not allowed during cross-examination  •  (C) Allowed in chief, re-examination and cross-examination without objection  •  (D) Permitted during cross-examination and when matters are introductory, undisputed, or sufficiently proved

✔ (D)

The rule is easy to state and constantly misremembered. In examination-in-chief and re-examination, leading questions must not be asked if the adverse party objects, save with the court's permission — and the court shall permit them as to matters which are introductory, undisputed, or in its opinion already sufficiently proved. In cross-examination, leading questions may always be asked. Option (B) states the exact opposite of the law.

Part VI — Alternative Dispute Resolution (Questions 47 to 50)

Q47. Which of the following is a characteristic of mediation?

(A) The mediator imposes a binding decision  •  (B) A neutral third party facilitates negotiation between the parties  •  (C) The mediator acts as a judge and renders a verdict  •  (D) It is always court-ordered

✔ (B)

The defining feature of mediation is that the neutral is a facilitator, not an adjudicator. He has no power to decide; he assists the parties to reach their own settlement. That distinguishes mediation from arbitration, where the tribunal does decide. Option (D) is wrong because mediation may be pre-litigation and voluntary — indeed Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act now makes pre-institution mediation mandatory in certain commercial suits, and the Mediation Act, 2023 has given the whole field a statutory framework.

Q48. ABC Ltd. and XYZ Pvt. Ltd. have an arbitration clause but fail to agree on the appointment of an arbitrator. Which provision applies?

(A) The court will appoint an arbitrator under Section 11  •  (B) The parties must mutually select one; if they fail, no arbitration  •  (C) The arbitrator must be appointed by the Indian Council of Arbitration in all cases  •  (D) The parties can opt for conciliation instead

✔ (A) Section 11

Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 exists precisely to break this deadlock. Where the agreed appointment procedure fails, the party may apply to the Supreme Court (international commercial arbitration) or the High Court (domestic), or a person or institution designated by them. Option (B) states the very mischief Section 11 was enacted to prevent — a recalcitrant party cannot defeat an arbitration clause by refusing to agree on a name.

Q49. Which of the following is not an advantage of using ADR?

(A) Generally faster than litigation  •  (B) Offers more confidentiality  •  (C) It always results in a binding decision  •  (D) Often less expensive than court proceedings

✔ (C)

Read the "not" — this is a negative-stem question and candidates lose marks on these through carelessness. ADR does not always produce a binding outcome. Mediation and conciliation may end in no settlement at all, and either party may walk away. Only arbitration yields a binding award. So (C) is both untrue as a statement and therefore the answer to a question asking what is not an advantage.

Q50. Which provision of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 governs enforcement of an arbitral award?

(A) Section 34 deals with enforcement  •  (B) Section 36 allows automatic enforcement unless set aside  •  (C) Section 9 governs enforcement  •  (D) Section 11 deals with enforcement, not appeal

✔ (B) Section 36

Section 36 provides that where the time for a Section 34 application has expired, the award shall be enforced in accordance with the CPC in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court. The 2015 Amendment made a change students still get wrong: the mere filing of a Section 34 petition no longer operates as an automatic stay; the court must grant a separate stay order. Section 34 is the ground for setting aside, and Section 9 is interim measures — neither concerns enforcement.

Part VII — Family Law (Questions 51 to 58)

Q51. Which sections deal with "sapinda relationship" under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

(A) Sections 3(f)(i), 5(v)  •  (B) Sections 3(f)(i), 5(iv)  •  (C) Sections 3(f)(i) & (ii), Explanation to 3(g), 5(iv)  •  (D) Sections 3(f)(i) & (ii), Explanation to 3(g), 5(v)

✔ (D)

Section 3(f)(i) defines the sapinda relationship — three generations in the line of ascent through the mother, five through the father. Section 3(f)(ii) tells you when two persons are sapindas of each other. Section 5(v) makes a marriage between sapindas void unless custom permits. The trap is 5(iv), which deals with degrees of prohibited relationship, a separate concept defined in Section 3(g). If you can keep 5(iv) and 5(v) apart, you can answer any sapinda question.

Q52. WITHDRAWN Under Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a divorced person, to marry again:

(A) must wait one year from the decree  •  (B) must wait six months from the decree  •  (C) may marry immediately thereafter without leave of the court, as a matter of right  •  (D) None of these

✔ (C) — but the question was withdrawn

Section 15 as originally enacted contained a proviso requiring a one-year wait, but that proviso was omitted by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. What survives is the condition that the right of appeal must be exhausted — either no appeal was presented, or the appeal has been dismissed, or the time for appealing has expired. So the answer is not quite as unqualified as option (C) makes it sound, and I suspect that is exactly why the question was withdrawn: (C) omits the appeal condition, and (D) is therefore arguable.

Q53. Aarti seeks divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA. Which statement is true?

(A) She can only seek divorce on adultery  •  (B) She can seek divorce on cruelty if she proves mental or physical cruelty  •  (C) Cruelty is not recognised under the HMA  •  (D) She must prove the cruelty was intentional

✔ (B)

Cruelty became a ground for divorce (as opposed to judicial separation) by the 1976 Amendment, and Section 13(1)(ia) covers mental as much as physical cruelty. Option (D) is the subtle distractor: intention is not an essential ingredient. The Supreme Court in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi (1988) held that cruelty may be intentional or unintentional; what matters is the effect of the conduct on the complaining spouse.

Q54. On matters where Dayabhaga is silent, what prevails?

(A) Local customs  •  (B) The Smritis  •  (C) The Shrutis  •  (D) Mitakshara

✔ (D) Mitakshara

The Mitakshara is the senior and more comprehensive commentary, running as a gloss on the Yajnavalkya Smriti and treated as authority throughout India save in Bengal and Assam. The Dayabhaga, written later by Jimutavahana, departs from it on specific points — principally the doctrine of survivorship and the son's right by birth. Where the Dayabhaga is silent, it has not departed, and the Mitakshara supplies the rule.

Q55. Nisha and Aakash both seek custody of their minor child under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. What will the court primarily consider?

(A) Financial stability of both parents  •  (B) Gender of the child  •  (C) The welfare and best interests of the child  •  (D) The financially stronger parent gets custody automatically

✔ (C)

Section 17 of the Guardians and Wards Act and Section 13 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act both make the welfare of the minor the paramount consideration. Financial capacity is a relevant factor but never determinative — if it were, the wealthier parent would always win, which is precisely what option (D) asserts and what the courts have repeatedly rejected. In Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal (2009) the Supreme Court emphasised that "welfare" includes moral and emotional welfare, not just material comfort.

Q56. Match the following: a. Spoken words; b. Deepika v. CAT; c. Silence; d. Ass Kaur v. Kartar Singh; e. Shayara Bano v. Union of India — with (i) Sunnat-ul-Qaul; (ii) Customary law; (iii) Sunnat-ul-Taqrir; (iv) Atypical relationships; (v) Triple talaq; (vi) Maintenance.

(A) a-i, b-ii, c-iii, d-iv, e-vi  •  (B) a-iii, b-i, c-i, d-v, e-vi  •  (C) a-i, b-iv, c-iii, d-ii, e-v  •  (D) a-iii, b-iv, c-i, d-ii, e-vi

✔ (C) a-i, b-iv, c-iii, d-ii, e-v

The Sunna is classified by how the Prophet's guidance was expressed: Sunnat-ul-Qaul is what was spoken, Sunnat-ul-Fail is what was done, and Sunnat-ul-Taqrir is silent approval — conduct done in his presence and not disapproved. That fixes (a) and (c) at once. Ass Kaur v. Kartar Singh (2007) concerned proof of custom, and Shayara Bano (2017) struck down instantaneous triple talaq. Even if you are unsure about Deepika v. CAT, four correct matches leave only option (C) standing — a useful reminder that matching questions can be solved by elimination.

Q57. WITHDRAWN Fatima, divorced by talaq, seeks maintenance for herself and her two minor children. Imran argues she has remarried and is not entitled. Which statement is true under Muslim law?

(A) Not entitled because she has remarried  •  (B) Entitled only for three months after divorce  •  (C) Entitled to maintenance for herself during iddat, and for her children until self-supporting  •  (D) Entitled indefinitely regardless of remarriage or the children's age

✔ (C) — but the question was withdrawn

The framework is Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986: a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance within the iddat period, plus maintenance for children for two years from their dates of birth. Danial Latifi v. Union of India (2001) read Section 3 as requiring provision extending beyond iddat. The children's entitlement is independent of the mother's conduct, which is why (A) fails. The question probably fell because option (C) does not sit neatly with either the strict statutory text or the Danial Latifi gloss.

Q58. The remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is given in which section of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

(A) 13  •  (B) 11  •  (C) 6  •  (D) 9

✔ (D) Section 9

Section 9 permits either spouse to apply where the other has withdrawn from the society of the petitioner without reasonable excuse. The neighbouring provisions are worth fixing: Section 10 is judicial separation, Section 11 void marriages, Section 12 voidable marriages, Section 13 divorce, Section 13B divorce by mutual consent. The constitutional validity of Section 9 was upheld in Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha (1984), overruling the Andhra Pradesh High Court's contrary view in T. Sareetha.

Part VIII — PIL and Administrative Law (Questions 59 to 65)

Q59. In which case did a prison inmate send a letter to the Supreme Court describing physical torture, which became a pioneer in public interest litigation?

(A) Hussainara Khatoon v. Bihar  •  (B) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration  •  (C) Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India  •  (D) The Narasimha Rao case

✔ (B) Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration

Sunil Batra, a convict in Tihar Jail, wrote a letter to Justice Krishna Iyer describing the torture of a fellow prisoner, Prem Chand, by a head warder. The Court treated the letter as a writ petition — the origin of what came to be called epistolary jurisdiction. Hussainara Khatoon concerned undertrial prisoners and speedy trial; Bandhua Mukti Morcha concerned bonded labour in stone quarries and is the subject of the very next question.

Q60. A social activist group discovered severe exploitation of labourers in stone quarries near Delhi in the early 1980s. Which view of the Supreme Court was sustained?

(A) Free legal aid is a mere directive principle, not enforceable  •  (B) The judgment focused on monetary compensation without addressing systemic bonded labour  •  (C) The right against forced labour is a fundamental right derived from the right to life and human dignity under Article 21  •  (D) Only government agencies, not social activists, could file such petitions

✔ (C)

These are the facts of Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984). The Court held that the right to live with human dignity under Article 21 encompasses freedom from bonded labour, read Article 23 alongside it, and appointed commissioners to investigate. Option (D) is the reverse of what the case decided — Bandhua Mukti Morcha is one of the foundational authorities expanding locus standi to public-spirited organisations.

Q61. Statement 1: In PIL cases, the Court plays a passive role similar to traditional cases. Statement 2: PIL is primarily focused on individual disputes.

(A) Both true  •  (B) Only Statement 1 true  •  (C) Only Statement 2 true  •  (D) Both false

✔ (D) Both are false

Both statements invert the defining features of PIL. The court's role is active, not passive — it appoints commissioners, monitors compliance, issues continuing mandamus and frames guidelines, none of which happens in adversarial litigation. And PIL is directed at collective or diffuse interests, not individual grievances; indeed the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against PIL being used to agitate private disputes.

Q62. Assertion (A): The concept of locus standi is relaxed in PIL cases. Reason (R): PIL allows any public-spirited person to approach the court on behalf of those who cannot represent themselves.

(A) Both true, R is the correct explanation of A  •  (B) Both true, R is not the correct explanation  •  (C) A true, R false  •  (D) A false, R true

✔ (A)

Both propositions are true, and the second is precisely why the first is true — which is what "correct explanation" requires. The traditional rule was that only the person whose right was infringed could sue. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) relaxed it, holding that where a legal wrong is caused to a person or class who by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability cannot approach the court, any member of the public acting bona fide may do so.

Q63. Which of the following best defines delegated legislation?

(A) Legislation passed by local governments  •  (B) Laws enacted by Parliament or the Legislature  •  (C) Laws made by an administrative authority under powers given by Parliament  •  (D) A judicial decision by an administrative tribunal

✔ (C)

Delegated (or subordinate) legislation is law made by an executive or administrative authority under authority conferred by the primary statute — rules, regulations, bye-laws, notifications, orders. The constitutional limit is that essential legislative functions, meaning the laying down of policy and standards, cannot be delegated (In re Delhi Laws Act, 1951). Option (B) describes primary legislation, which is the opposite.

Q64. In 2020 at Dhorodo village, Panchayat elections could not be held due to Covid while the Panchayat's tenure expired. Mr. Haribansh, representing the people after dissolution, made a law under the state Panchayati Raj Act restricting daily economic activity to ₹100. In which case is this allowed or restricted?

(A) MCD v. Birla Cotton Mills  •  (B) Patna University v. Amita Tiwari  •  (C) Jalan Trading v. Union of India  •  (D) None of these

✔ (A) MCD v. Birla Cotton Mills — but see the caveat below

Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills (1968) is the leading authority on delegation of legislative power to a local body: the Court upheld the delegation because the parent Act supplied sufficient policy and guidelines, and because a democratically constituted local body is answerable to its electorate. That last strand is what makes the question interesting — here the body's tenure had expired, so the accountability rationale had fallen away.

A candid note: this is the one question in the paper on which I would not stake much. Published keys differ — some give (A), others (D) "None of these", on the footing that no listed case addresses a delegate acting after his term has expired. The BCI did not withdraw it, so (A) stands as the operative answer, but if you got (D) your reasoning was not unsound.

Q65. Which of the following is/are not ground(s) for judicial review of administrative action? (1) Illegality; (2) Irrationality; (3) Proportionality; (4) Public opinion.

(A) Only (2)  •  (B) (2) and (4)  •  (C) (1), (2) and (3)  •  (D) Only (4)

✔ (D) Only (4)

Lord Diplock's classification in the CCSU case (1985) gives three heads — illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety — and he expressly contemplated proportionality as a fourth head that might in time be adopted. Indian courts have adopted it, particularly in fundamental rights cases. Public opinion is not, and has never been, a ground of judicial review. Courts review legality, not popularity.

Part IX — Professional Ethics and Bar Council Rules (Questions 66 to 69)

Q66. What does "conflict of interest" refer to in professional ethics?

(A) A situation involving legal disputes  •  (B) Where two professionals disagree  •  (C) A conflict between ethics and laws  •  (D) Where personal interests conflict with professional duties

✔ (D)

In advocacy the rule is strict, and it is worth knowing the specific provisions rather than the abstract definition. Rule 9 of the BCI Rules bars an advocate from acting or pleading in any matter in which he has a pecuniary interest. Rule 22 bars bidding for property sold in execution of a decree in any proceeding in which he was professionally engaged. Rule 33 bars appearing for one side after having advised or drawn pleadings for the other.

Q67. Advocate X accepted a bribe from the opposing party to delay his own client's case, and failed to inform the client of hearing dates, leading to adverse judgments. Select the correct option.

(A) Violation of Bar Council of India Rules on professional ethics  •  (B) Only an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act  •  (C) Criminal conspiracy under the BNS  •  (D) Contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

✔ (A)

This is professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, triable by the State Bar Council's Disciplinary Committee, with punishments ranging from reprimand to removal from the roll. The specific rules broken are Rule 15 (duty to fight fearlessly for the client) and Rule 19 (duty to keep the client informed). Option (B) fails because an advocate is not a "public servant" for the Prevention of Corruption Act, and because "only" is wrong in any event — the same facts can attract disciplinary and criminal consequences together.

Q68. The nature of proceedings in cases of professional misconduct is: (1) Criminal; (2) Neither civil nor criminal; (3) Quasi-criminal; (4) Civil.

(A) Both (1) and (4)  •  (B) Only (2)  •  (C) Only (3)  •  (D) (1), (3) and (4)

✔ (C) Only (3) — quasi-criminal

Disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in character, and the label carries real consequences. Because the advocate's livelihood and reputation are at stake, the charge must be specific, the advocate must be given a proper opportunity to defend, and the standard of proof approaches that in criminal cases — a mere preponderance of probabilities will not do. The Supreme Court has said as much in Noratanmal Chaurasia v. M.R. Murli and in several later decisions.

Q69. WITHDRAWN Which of the following is/are not procedural safeguard(s)? (1) Act in a fraudulent manner; (2) Providing peer-review of valuation, if necessary; (3) Non-disclosure of any prior association with the client; (4) Non-disclosure of any possible source of conflict of interest.

(A) (3) and (4)  •  (B) Only (2)  •  (C) Only (4)  •  (D) (2) and (4)

Withdrawn — no option is correct

The withdrawal is easy to justify, and it is worth working through because it teaches you how to spot a broken question in the hall. The stem asks what is not a safeguard. Item (2), peer review, plainly is a safeguard. Items (1), (3) and (4) — acting fraudulently, concealing a prior association, concealing a conflict of interest — are all the opposite of safeguards. So the correct response is "(1), (3) and (4)", and no option offered it. The paper-setter appears to have written the stem in the affirmative and then inserted the negative without adjusting the options.

Part X — Company, Environmental and Cyber Law (Questions 70 to 75)

Q70. As per Section 2(84), "share" means a share in the share capital of a company and includes: (1) Debentures; (2) Preference shares; (3) Stocks; (4) Bonds.

(A) (1) and (2)  •  (B) (1), (2) and (3)  •  (C) Only (3)  •  (D) (1), (2), (3) and (4)

✔ (C) Only (3) — stock

Section 2(84) of the Companies Act, 2013 is short and exhaustive: "share means a share in the share capital of a company and includes stock." Nothing else. The temptation is to include preference shares, but they are already a species of share and do not need an inclusive limb. Debentures and bonds are debt instruments, defined separately in Section 2(30) — a debenture-holder is a creditor of the company, not a member.

Q71. Section 43 of the Companies Act, 2013 provides for:

(A) Issue of shares at premium  •  (B) Kinds of share capital  •  (C) Buy-back of shares  •  (D) Reduction in share capital

✔ (B) Kinds of share capital

Section 43 provides that the share capital of a company limited by shares shall be of two kinds — equity share capital (with voting rights, or with differential rights as to dividend or voting as prescribed) and preference share capital. The distractors are all real provisions worth remembering: Section 52 is the securities premium account, Section 66 reduction of share capital, and Section 68 buy-back.

Q72. A Surat manufacturing company discharges untreated industrial waste into a river. Which provision is violated?

(A) Section 24 of the Water Act, 1974  •  (B) Section 40 of the Water Act, 1974  •  (C) No violation  •  (D) Section 23 of the Water Act, 1974

✔ (A) Section 24

Section 24 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 is the core prohibition: no person shall knowingly cause or permit any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter to enter into any stream or well or sewer or on land. Section 23 is the power of the Board to enter and take samples, and Section 40 is offences by companies — a machinery provision that fixes vicarious liability on directors, not the prohibition itself. Contravention of Section 24 is punishable under Section 43 with imprisonment of not less than one year and six months.

Q73. Which Act is popularly known as umbrella legislation?

(A) Water Act, 1974  •  (B) Air Act, 1981  •  (C) Factories Act, 1948  •  (D) Environment (Protection) Act, 1986

✔ (D) Environment (Protection) Act, 1986

The EPA is called umbrella legislation because it was enacted under Article 253 to implement the decisions of the 1972 Stockholm Conference, and it confers on the Central Government wide residuary powers to take "all such measures as it deems necessary" for protecting and improving the environment. It fills the gaps left by the sector-specific Water and Air Acts rather than replacing them. It was passed in the aftermath of the Bhopal gas disaster.

Q74. Which of the following is/are included under Section 2(1)(w) of the IT Act, 2000, describing "intermediary"? (1) Cyber cafes; (2) Telecom regulators; (3) Social media platforms; (4) Internet service providers.

(A) (1), (2) and (3)  •  (B) (1), (3) and (4)  •  (C) (1), (2) and (4)  •  (D) (1), (2), (3) and (4)

✔ (B) (1), (3) and (4)

Section 2(1)(w) defines an intermediary as any person who on behalf of another receives, stores or transmits an electronic record or provides any service with respect to it, and the inclusive list expressly names telecom service providers, network service providers, internet service providers, web-hosting service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online auction sites, online market places and cyber cafes. A telecom regulator such as TRAI is a statutory regulator, not a service provider — it neither receives nor transmits records on anyone's behalf. That single word "regulator" is the whole question.

Q75. ANSWER REVISED Malti's online store is hacked and customer data stolen; customers report unauthorised transactions. Select the correct option.

(A) Punishable under Section 66 of the IT Act, 2000  •  (B) Punishable only under criminal laws  •  (C) Punishable under Section 66 and customers may also claim compensation in certain circumstances  •  (D) No legal remedy under the IT Act

✔ (A) and (C) both accepted — revised from (C) alone

Both are right, which is why the BCI ultimately gave credit for either. Section 66 punishes dishonestly or fraudulently doing any act referred to in Section 43, with up to three years and a fine of up to ₹5 lakh. Section 43 independently gives a civil remedy in damages by way of compensation to the person affected. So (A) is correct as far as it goes, and (C) is correct and more complete. A candidate who ticked (A) had the law right and should not have been penalised — the objection succeeded on exactly that reasoning.

Part XI — Labour and Industrial Law (Questions 76 to 79)

Q76. Which of the following is/are included under "employer" in the Industrial Relations Code, 2020? (1) Occupier of the factory; (2) Contractor; (3) Manager of the factory; (4) Managing director of the factory.

(A) Only (4)  •  (B) (1), (3) and (4)  •  (C) (1), (2) and (4)  •  (D) (1), (2) and (3)

✔ (D) (1), (2) and (3)

Section 2(m) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 defines "employer" inclusively: in relation to a factory, the occupier and any person named as manager under Section 7(1)(f) of the Factories Act; in relation to any other establishment, the person having ultimate control, and where control is entrusted to a manager or managing director, that person; plus the contractor and the legal representative of a deceased employer. Note the drafting closely: the managing director limb is expressed for establishments other than factories, which is what excludes item (4) from a question framed around a factory. This is a badly drafted question, but that is the reasoning behind the key.

Q77. Which legislations have been included under the Social Security Code, 2020? (1) Maternity Benefit Act, 1961; (2) Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972; (3) Payment of Bonus Act, 1965; (4) Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959.

(A) Only (3)  •  (B) (3) and (4)  •  (C) (1), (2) and (4)  •  (D) (1), (2), (3) and (4)

✔ (C) (1), (2) and (4)

The Code on Social Security, 2020 subsumed nine enactments — the EPF Act, ESI Act, Employees' Compensation Act, Maternity Benefit Act, Payment of Gratuity Act, Cine Workers Welfare Fund Act, Building and Other Construction Workers Cess Act, Unorganised Workers' Social Security Act and the Employment Exchanges Act. The Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 is not among them — bonus is remuneration, and it went into the Code on Wages, 2019 along with the Minimum Wages Act, Payment of Wages Act and Equal Remuneration Act. Sort the four Codes by subject matter and this family of questions answers itself.

Q78. ________ have not been set up under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication of industrial disputes.

(A) Industrial Tribunals  •  (B) Environmental Tribunals  •  (C) Labour Courts  •  (D) National Tribunal

✔ (B) Environmental Tribunals

The adjudicatory machinery under the Industrial Disputes Act runs: Works Committee (Section 3), Conciliation Officers (Section 4), Boards of Conciliation (Section 5), Courts of Inquiry (Section 6), Labour Courts (Section 7), Industrial Tribunals (Section 7A) and National Tribunals (Section 7B). Environmental tribunals have nothing to do with this statute — the National Green Tribunal was constituted under the NGT Act, 2010.

Q79. XYZ Textiles terminated four workers for misconduct after a show-cause notice and disciplinary enquiry. The workers claimed retrenchment compensation, which was rejected. Select the correct answer.

(A) Not retrenchment, hence no compensation  •  (B) Amounts to lay-off, compensation payable  •  (C) Amounts to retrenchment, compensation payable  •  (D) Violates the Industrial Disputes Act, compensation payable

✔ (A)

Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines retrenchment as termination for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action — and clause (b) says so in terms. A termination following a show-cause notice and a domestic enquiry is punishment for misconduct, and is therefore outside the definition altogether. No retrenchment means no Section 25F compensation. Lay-off under Section 2(kkk) is quite different: it is a temporary inability to give employment while the workman remains on the rolls.

Part XII — Law of Torts (Questions 80 to 84)

Q80. Ms J, a banker, refuses to honour Ms F's cheque although she had sufficient balance. Ms F suffers no loss. Under which principle can Ms F file the case?

(A) Volenti non fit injuria  •  (B) Injuria sine damno  •  (C) Damnum sine injuria  •  (D) Res ipsa loquitur

✔ (B) Injuria sine damno

Legal injury without actual damage — actionable per se. These are the facts of Marzetti v. Williams (1830), where a banker wrongfully dishonoured a customer's cheque despite sufficient funds and was held liable although no pecuniary loss followed. The Indian counterpart every student should know is Ashby v. White, where a voter wrongfully prevented from voting recovered although his candidate won. Keep the pair the right way round: injuria sine damno is actionable; damnum sine injuria is not.

Q81. Mr B told Mr A to leave the premises. When A refused, B gathered workmen who mustered round A, tucked up their sleeves and aprons, and threatened to break his neck. He did not leave. Under which tort can A sue?

(A) False imprisonment  •  (B) Assault  •  (C) Battery  •  (D) Hurt

✔ (B) Assault

These are the facts of Read v. Coombes (1850). Assault is an act that causes a reasonable apprehension of immediate unlawful force; battery requires actual contact, and there was none here. The workmen had the present ability to carry out the threat, which is what distinguishes this from Tuberville v. Savage, where the words accompanying the gesture negated any present intention. "Hurt" is a criminal law concept under the BNS, not a tort.

Q82. Ms J took a lift knowing the driver Mr T was under the influence of alcohol. The car crashed and she was injured. Which defence could Mr T claim?

(A) Volenti non fit injuria  •  (B) Act of God  •  (C) Inevitable accident  •  (D) Act of necessity

✔ (A) Volenti non fit injuria

A person who voluntarily assumes a known risk cannot complain of the resulting harm. These are essentially the facts of Dann v. Hamilton (1939), and it is worth knowing that the defence actually failed on those facts because the driver's intoxication was not so extreme as to be obviously and glaringly dangerous — mere knowledge of a risk is not consent to it (scienti non est volenti). The question asks only what defence could be claimed, and volenti is the answer.

Q83. Mr K lets rooms in his building. Mr Y erects an adjacent cotton mill afterwards. Owing to the noise and smoke, several rooms are vacated, causing loss to Mr K. Examine the relevant tort.

(A) Damnum sine injuria  •  (B) Trespass to land  •  (C) Nuisance  •  (D) Negligence

✔ (C) Nuisance

Private nuisance is an unlawful interference with a person's use or enjoyment of land, and noise and smoke are its classic instances. Two traps sit in this question. First, "the mill came later" is irrelevant — coming to the nuisance is not a defence (Sturges v. Bridgman). Second, this is not damnum sine injuria: there is real legal injury here, not merely lawful competitive harm. Trespass is out because trespass requires a direct physical entry; smoke and noise are indirect and therefore nuisance.

Q84. A government bus and a private bus collide. The private bus was coming from the wrong side; the government bus was being driven rashly and did not slow down on seeing the other. Determine the tortious position.

(A) Private bus owner is negligent  •  (B) Government bus owner is negligent  •  (C) Inevitable accident  •  (D) Contributory negligence

✔ (D) Contributory negligence

Both drivers were at fault, and both faults contributed to the collision. The modern rule, following the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945 in England and adopted in India, is apportionment — damages are reduced to the extent of the claimant's own share of the blame, rather than the claim being defeated altogether. The related doctrine worth knowing is the last opportunity rule (Davies v. Mann), under which the party who had the final chance to avoid the accident bears the loss.

Part XIII — Taxation Law (Questions 85 to 88)

Q85. The term "income" is described in the Income Tax Act, 1961 under:

(A) Section 2(24)  •  (B) Section 2(40)  •  (C) Section 3  •  (D) Section 10E

✔ (A) Section 2(24)

Section 2(24) is an inclusive and not an exhaustive definition — it says income "includes" and then runs through profits and gains, dividend, voluntary contributions received by a trust, perquisites, capital gains, winnings from lotteries and crossword puzzles, and much else. The inclusive drafting is deliberate: it lets the revenue bring in receipts that are income in the ordinary commercial sense even if not expressly listed. Section 2(40) defines "regular assessment" and Section 3 the "previous year".

Q86. Mr. X deposits ₹65,000 in a 5-year Post Office term deposit to claim a deduction under Section 80C, and does not opt for the concessional regime under Section 115BAC. Select the correct option.

(A) Guilty of tax evasion or tax avoidance  •  (B) Not guilty of either  •  (C) No deduction can be availed under Section 80C  •  (D) Unlawful to treat as personal expenditure

✔ (B)

This is legitimate tax planning, and the distinction between the three is the whole point of the question. Tax evasion is illegal — concealment, falsification, suppression. Tax avoidance is the use of artificial devices that comply with the letter of the law while defeating its purpose, and is now largely caught by the GAAR provisions in Chapter X-A. Tax planning is arranging one's affairs to take a deduction Parliament expressly created for that purpose. A five-year Post Office time deposit is a specified investment under Section 80C, and taking it is exactly what the section invites.

Q87. Statement 1: Agricultural income is exempt under Section 10(1). Statement 2: Where non-agricultural income exceeds the basic exemption limit and agricultural income exceeds ₹5,000, tax is determined by the scheme of partial integration.

(A) Both incorrect  •  (B) Only Statement 1 true  •  (C) Only Statement 2 true  •  (D) Both correct

✔ (D) Both are correct

Agricultural income is exempt under Section 10(1) because Entry 82 of the Union List excludes it from the Union's taxing power — agricultural income tax is a State subject under Entry 46 of the State List. But the exemption is not absolute in its effect. Where both conditions in Statement 2 are satisfied, the partial integration mechanism aggregates agricultural income with total income solely to determine the rate at which the non-agricultural income is taxed. The agricultural income itself is still not taxed; it only pushes the other income into a higher slab.

Q88. Rent-free accommodation provided by an employer to an employee is:

(A) Perquisite under Section 17(2)  •  (B) Perquisite under Section 16(2)  •  (C) Allowance under Section 10(13A)  •  (D) Allowance under Section 10(1)

✔ (A) Perquisite under Section 17(2)

Section 17(2)(i) expressly includes "the value of rent-free accommodation provided to the assessee by his employer" within the definition of perquisite. Keep the distinction clear: an allowance is a cash payment (house rent allowance under Section 10(13A) is the example in option C), while a perquisite is a benefit in kind. Rent-free accommodation is a benefit in kind, and it is valued under Rule 3 of the Income Tax Rules.

Part XIV — Contract, Specific Relief and Property (Questions 89 to 96)

Q89. An agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void under:

(A) Section 2(d)  •  (B) Section 2(e)  •  (C) Section 2(f)  •  (D) Section 2(g)

✔ (D) Section 2(g)

Section 2 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 is worth memorising clause by clause, because the AIBE returns to it every year. 2(d) consideration; 2(e) agreement; 2(f) reciprocal promises; 2(g) void agreement; 2(h) contract (an agreement enforceable by law); 2(i) voidable contract; 2(j) a contract which becomes void. Note the difference between 2(g) and 2(j) — the first is void ab initio, the second was valid and later became unenforceable.

Q90. The concept of invalid guarantee is covered under Sections:

(A) 142–146  •  (B) 142–144  •  (C) 143–147  •  (D) 140–143

✔ (B) Sections 142 to 144

Three consecutive sections make a guarantee invalid. Section 142 — guarantee obtained by misrepresentation of a material part of the transaction. Section 143 — guarantee obtained by the creditor's concealment of a material circumstance. Section 144 — guarantee given on the condition that the creditor shall not act on it until a co-surety joins, where that co-surety does not join. Section 140 is the surety's right of subrogation and Section 141 his right to the creditor's securities — both are surety rights, not grounds of invalidity.

Q91. "B" took ₹50 lakhs in advance and then refused to execute the sale deed, having received a better offer. "A" demands enforcement under the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Where must "A" sue?

(A) Criminal court under the BNSS, 2023  •  (B) A special court constituted under the Specific Relief Act  •  (C) Civil court having powers under the CPC, 1908  •  (D) No suit lies as there is no breach

✔ (C) Civil court under the CPC, 1908

Option (B) is the trap, and it is a good one. The Specific Relief Act does not constitute its own courts — what Section 20B (inserted by the 2018 Amendment) does is enable the State Government, in consultation with the Chief Justice, to designate existing civil courts as Special Courts for infrastructure project contracts. That is designation, not constitution, and it does not apply to an ordinary sale of land. Note also that after the 2018 Amendment, specific performance is no longer discretionary; under the amended Section 10 it shall be enforced subject to Sections 11(2), 14 and 16.

Q92. "A" transfers land to "B" on the condition that "B" shall not transfer it to anyone else for the next 10 years. Select the correct option.

(A) Conditional transfer of property  •  (B) Conditional limitations on transfer of property  •  (C) Subsequent transfer of property  •  (D) Condition precedent in the transfer of property

✔ (B)

The governing provision is Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the governing distinction is between absolute and partial restraints. An absolute restraint on alienation is void; a partial restraint, limited in time or in the class of transferees, is valid. A ten-year bar is partial and therefore holds. The label the question wants is "conditional limitation" — a restriction operating on an estate already transferred — as distinct from a condition precedent (option D), which must be fulfilled before the transfer takes effect at all. Here the land has already passed to B; the restriction bites afterwards.

Q93. Mr. Rajesh's cheque for ₹50,000 to Mr. Sharma is returned for insufficient funds. Select the correct option.

(A) Complaint within three months  •  (B) Complaint within one month  •  (C) Complaint within five months  •  (D) Complaint within two months

✔ (B) One month

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act runs on a strict timetable, and the "one month" in the question is the last limb, not the first. The sequence is: cheque presented within its validity; on dishonour, a demand notice within 30 days of receiving the bank's memo; the drawer then has 15 days to pay; and if he does not, the payee must file the complaint within one month of the expiry of those 15 days, under Section 142(b). Miss any of the three windows and the complaint fails, though the proviso to Section 142(b) allows the court to condone delay in filing for sufficient cause.

Q94. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 relates to:

(A) Rescission of contracts  •  (B) Cancellation of instruments  •  (C) Declaratory decrees  •  (D) Perpetual injunction

✔ (B) Cancellation of instruments

Section 31 allows a person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that it may cause him serious injury if left outstanding, to sue to have it adjudged void and delivered up and cancelled. Fix the map: Section 27 rescission, Section 31 cancellation, Section 34 declaratory decrees, Section 38 perpetual injunction, Section 39 mandatory injunction. Note the practical difference between rescission and cancellation — rescission undoes a contract between parties, cancellation destroys an instrument and binds the world through the register.

Q95. How may the recovery of specific immovable property be enforced?

(A) In the manner provided by the Specific Relief Act, 1963  •  (B) By the Transfer of Property Act, 1882  •  (C) By the CrPC, 1973  •  (D) By the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

✔ (D) The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 5 of the Specific Relief Act says so in terms: a person entitled to the possession of specific immovable property may recover it in the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Option (A) is the plausible-looking wrong answer — the Specific Relief Act creates the right and then points to the CPC for the machinery. Do not confuse Section 5 with Section 6, the summary remedy for a person dispossessed without consent otherwise than in due course of law, which must be brought within six months and from which no appeal or review lies.

Q96. Which section defines: "A proposal may be revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against the proposer, but not afterwards"?

(A) Section 5  •  (B) Section 4  •  (C) Section 6  •  (D) Section 7

✔ (A) Section 5

Section 5 must be read with Section 4, which fixes the moment of completion. Communication of an acceptance is complete as against the proposer when it is put in course of transmission so as to be out of the acceptor's power. So once the letter of acceptance is posted, the offeror can no longer revoke — even though as against the acceptor the communication is complete only when it reaches the proposer. That asymmetry is the whole of the postal rule, and Section 5 is the section that operationalises it.

Part XV — Land Acquisition and Intellectual Property (Questions 97 to 100)

Q97. ANSWER REVISED Under the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, governments can acquire land for: (i) strategic purposes; (ii) projects for families affected by projects; (iii) public-private partnership projects where ownership of the land continues to vest in the government.

(A) (i) & (ii)  •  (B) (ii) & (iii)  •  (C) (i) & (iii)  •  (D) (i), (ii) & (iii)

✔ (D) All three — revised from (A) in the final key

The revision is correct, and the reason lies in Section 2 of the 2013 Act. Section 2(1) permits acquisition for the Government's own use, hold and control, and the definition of "public purpose" in Section 2(1)(a) expressly includes strategic purposes relating to the armed forces, and in Section 2(1)(b) projects for project-affected families. Section 2(2)(a) then permits acquisition for public-private partnership projects where the ownership of the land continues to vest with the Government, subject to the consent of 70% of affected families. All three limbs are in the Act, and the provisional key marking only (i) and (ii) was wrong.

Q98. The Land Acquisition Act, 2013 replaced which earlier legislation?

(A) Land Acquisition Act, 1956  •  (B) 1862  •  (C) 1894  •  (D) 1874

✔ (C) Land Acquisition Act, 1894

The 1894 Act governed compulsory acquisition in India for 119 years before the 2013 Act replaced it. The change was not merely of nomenclature: the new Act introduced the social impact assessment, the consent requirement for private and PPP projects, a compensation multiplier of up to four times the market value in rural areas and two times in urban areas, and a statutory rehabilitation and resettlement entitlement — none of which the colonial statute had.

Q99. Soham's app "FitLife" faces a competing app "FitLyfe" with a similar logo. Under trademark law, can he claim infringement for the similar name and logo?

(A) Yes, if he can prove the names are confusingly similar  •  (B) No, because the competing app has a different name and logo  •  (C) Yes, but only if the competitor is a small business  •  (D) No, infringement requires identical copying

✔ (A)

Section 29(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 catches a mark that is identical or similar to a registered mark used for identical or similar goods or services, where such use is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public or to cause the public to assume an association. Option (D) states the opposite of the law — if identity were required, the entire doctrine of deceptive similarity would be redundant. "FitLife" against "FitLyfe" is a textbook phonetic and visual near-identity, and the size of the infringer is legally irrelevant, which disposes of (C).

Q100. What is the duration of copyright protection for literary works in India?

(A) 50 years from creation  •  (B) 60 years from publication  •  (C) Lifetime of the author plus 60 years  •  (D) 10 years from first sale

✔ (C) Lifetime of the author plus 60 years

Section 22 of the Copyright Act, 1957: copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work published within the author's lifetime subsists until sixty years from the beginning of the calendar year next following the year in which the author dies. India therefore grants ten years more than the Berne Convention minimum of life plus fifty. The counting rule matters — the sixty years run from the start of the following calendar year, not from the date of death. Different terms apply to photographs, films and sound recordings, which run sixty years from publication.

What This Paper Teaches About Preparing for the AIBE

Having worked through all hundred questions, four things stand out, and they are worth more than the answer key itself.

1. The new criminal codes are examined by section number, not by concept. Twenty-six of the hundred questions came from the BNS, BNSS and BSA, and the overwhelming majority asked simply "which section". Snatching is 304 BNS. Zero FIR is 173 BNSS. Trial in absentia is 356. Electronic mode is 530. Repeal is 531. Coercion is the new word in Section 22 BSA. None of this can be reasoned out in the hall; it is recall, and it is the cheapest 20-odd marks in the paper.

2. Learn the changes, not just the provisions. The most efficiently constructed questions in this paper turned on what the new codes did differently — the fine under Section 182 BNS going from ₹100 to ₹300, the word "coercion" entering Section 22 BSA, the new proviso in Section 165 BSA about Ministers and the President. A candidate revising the BNS as though it were the IPC with new numbers will lose every one of these.

3. Read negative stems twice. Questions 49, 65, 69 and 78 all asked what is not the case. Question 69 was withdrawn precisely because the paper-setter himself got tangled in the negative. In an open-book examination with no negative marking, there is no reason to lose a mark to a misread stem.

4. Know your torts by their facts. All five tort questions were fact patterns lifted from decided cases — Marzetti v. Williams, Read v. Coombes, Dann v. Hamilton, a private nuisance, and a contributory negligence collision. If you can attach a case name to a fact pattern, these are the fastest marks in the paper.

And a word about the seven withdrawn questions.

Q4 cited the wrong Articles for the 106th Amendment. Q14 asked for an answer under a repealed Code. Q69 posed a negative question to which none of the four options was the answer. These were not hard questions — they were broken ones, and a candidate who spent five minutes each trying to force one of the options to fit lost fifteen minutes and gained nothing, because the BCI eventually gave everyone the marks anyway. Learn to recognise a defective question quickly and walk away from it. On this paper that skill alone was worth seven marks and a quarter of an hour.

Set A of AIBE 19 was, on the whole, a fair paper. Nothing in it required more than a working command of the bare Acts, and the open-book format means the bare Acts can sit on the desk in front of you. Tab them by section number before you go in, and the section-recall questions that make up half this paper answer themselves.

The questions reproduced above are from the All India Bar Examination XIX (Set Code A) conducted by the Bar Council of India on 22 December 2024, and are reproduced for the educational benefit of candidates. The answers and explanations are my own work. The withdrawal of seven questions and the revision of three answers are as recorded in the BCI's final answer key released on 6 March 2025. Where I have been uncertain, I have said so on the face of the explanation. The official answer key published by the Bar Council of India at allindiabarexamination.com remains the authoritative source, and nothing here is legal advice. Please read our Disclaimer for more details.