Solved Paper by Akinchan Aggarwal, Advocate — B.A. (Hons.) Gold Medalist, LL.B. (University Rank 2), LL.M. (Dispute Resolution), UGC–NET, Ph.D. (Pursuing)
All India Bar Examination XXI (AIBE 21), Set Code A — held 7 June 2026.
All 100 questions with the four options, the Bar Council of India's final answer key published on 10 July 2026, and an explanation for each. A consolidated key appears at the end.
Read This Before You Revise From Any Other Copy
Several answer keys for this paper are circulating in PDF and on coaching channels. We compared the most widely shared of them against the official final answer key issued by the Bar Council of India after the objection window closed.
They differ on nine questions. On eight of those, the circulating key is simply wrong. On the ninth, the BCI accepted two options and the circulating key gives only one.
| Question | Circulating key | BCI final key | Subject |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 | C | C or D | Consumer Protection |
| Q7 | D | A | Land Acquisition |
| Q31 | C | A | Advocates Act |
| Q40 | A | B | Jurisprudence |
| Q44 | A | B | Specific Relief |
| Q60 | B | C | Family Law (UCC) |
| Q70 | D | C | Constitution / Environment |
| Q80 | D | A | Administrative Law |
| Q82 | B | A | Evidence |
Three of those are not close calls. Q31 turns on the words of Rule 8 of the BCI Rules, which says Executive Committee. Q70 turns on the preamble to the Air Act, which recites Article 253. Q82 asks for the case that laid down the five golden principles of circumstantial evidence, which is Sharad Birdhichand Sarda and has been for forty years. If you have been revising from a key that says otherwise, you have been memorising errors.
Exam at a Glance
| Particular | Detail |
|---|---|
| Examination | All India Bar Examination XXI (AIBE 21) |
| Conducted by | Bar Council of India |
| Exam date | 7 June 2026 |
| Set code solved here | Set A (the BCI key covers Sets A, B, C and D) |
| Questions | 100, objective, open book |
| Provisional key | 10 June 2026; objections until 17 June 2026 (Rs 500 per objection) |
| Final key | 10 July 2026 |
| Qualifying marks | 45% for General; 40% for SC/ST |
| Questions deleted | None — all 100 carry an answer |
That last row is worth pausing on. In AIBE XIX the BCI withdrew seven questions and revised three in the final key. In AIBE XXI it withdrew none. Every one of the 100 questions carries a marked answer, and on a single question the BCI accepted two options rather than dropping it. Do not assume, as several circulating keys do, that questions you find objectionable were struck out.
All 100 Questions, Solved
The answer given against each question is the BCI final answer key for Set A. The explanation is ours.
Questions 1 to 25
Q1. A Statement is followed by two Conclusions. Statement: Section 5 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 gives a detailed procedure for fixing or revising minimum wages in respect of any scheduled employment. After considering the advice of the committees appointed, and all representations received by it before the date notified in the Gazette notification, the appropriate Government may by notification in the official gazette, fix or revise the minimum rates of wages. Conclusion I: If a date is specified in the notification, the minimum rates shall come into force from such date. Conclusion II: If no date is specified, they shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of issue of the notification. Which one is correct?
(A) Both Conclusions I and II follow
(B) Only Conclusion II follows
(C) Neither Conclusion I nor II follows
(D) Only Conclusion I follows
Answer: (A) — Section 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 provides that the notification shall come into force on the date specified in it, and where no date is specified, on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue. Both conclusions restate the sub-section, so both follow.
Q2. As per the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, what are one-sided agreements?
(A) Unilateral contracts
(B) Quasi contracts
(C) Unfair trade practices
(D) Unconscionable
Answer: (C) or (D) — the BCI accepted both options in the final key, and this is the only question in Set A on which it did so. The 2019 Act introduced the concept of an "unfair contract" in Section 2(46), aimed at terms that cause a significant change in the rights of a consumer; such one-sided terms are described both as unconscionable and as falling within the Act's unfair-practice vocabulary. Neither (A) nor (B) is defensible: a unilateral contract and a quasi contract are ordinary contract-law concepts with nothing to do with one-sidedness.
Q3. Assertion (A): The Constitution of India does not adopt a rigid separation of powers among the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. Reason (R): The constitutional framework incorporates a system of checks and balances, allowing limited functional overlap among the organs of the State.
(A) (A) is false, but (R) is true
(B) Both (A) and (R) are true, and (R) is the correct explanation of (A)
(C) (A) is true, but (R) is false
(D) Both (A) and (R) are true, but (R) is not the correct explanation of (A)
Answer: (B) — India follows a functional, not a rigid, separation of powers. The overlap is deliberate: the executive is drawn from and answerable to the legislature, the legislature exercises judicial-type powers in matters of privilege, and the judiciary makes rules. The system of checks and balances is precisely why the separation is not rigid, so (R) explains (A).
Q4. Consider: I. Judicial review extends to constitutional amendments. II. Laws inserted into the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 remain open to scrutiny for violation of the basic structure. III. Parliament's amending power under Article 368 is unlimited. Which is/are correct?
(A) I, II and III
(B) I and II
(C) II and III
(D) I only
Answer: (B) — I is correct on Kesavananda Bharati. II is correct on I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007), which fixed 24 April 1973 — the date of Kesavananda — as the cut-off after which Ninth Schedule entries are testable against the basic structure. III is wrong for the same reason: the amending power is wide but not unlimited.
Q5. In execution proceedings under the CPC, 1908, where property of the judgment-debtor is attached and a third party raises a claim asserting independent title, such claim:
(A) Shall be adjudicated by the executing court
(B) Requires prior determination by the court which passed the decree
(C) Must be decided by instituting a separate civil suit
(D) Can be decided only after completion of execution proceedings
Answer: (A) — Order XXI Rules 58 to 61 require claims and objections to attachment to be adjudicated by the executing court itself, and Rule 58 expressly bars a separate suit on the same question. The order made is treated as a decree and is appealable, which is what makes a fresh suit unnecessary.
Q6. Which provision of the CrPC, 1973 provides a summary remedy for maintenance of spouses, children and parents unable to support themselves?
(A) Section 320
(B) Section 107
(C) Section 144
(D) Section 125
Answer: (D) — Section 125 CrPC, now Section 144 BNSS, 2023. Note the trap the renumbering creates: the old Section 144 (public nuisance orders) is now Section 163 BNSS, while the new Section 144 BNSS is maintenance. The question is set on the CrPC, so the answer is 125.
Q7. Under the law relating to land acquisition in India, which statement is not true?
(A) All persons interested in the land shall appear personally before the Collector
(B) A minimum notice period of 30 days is to be given to all persons interested
(C) The Collector shall publish the public notice on his website
(D) Such interested persons may file objections within 6 months of the notice
Answer: (A) — under Section 21 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 a person interested may appear in person or by an agent or advocate; personal appearance is not compulsory, so (A) is untrue. A caution: option (D) is also inaccurate, since Section 21(2) allows objections within sixty days, not six months. The question therefore contains two untrue statements and is defective; the BCI resolved it in favour of (A) and did not withdraw it.
Q8. Regarding criminal conspiracy under Section 120A IPC, which statement is legally accurate?
(A) The mere agreement is sufficient to constitute the offence if the intended crime is punishable by death or rigorous imprisonment
(B) A minimum of five persons must participate
(C) A solitary individual's mere intention is sufficient for conviction
(D) It is barred from being charged along with other substantive offences
Answer: (A) — the proviso to Section 120A requires an overt act only where the agreement is to do an illegal act that is not an offence, or a legal act by illegal means. Where the agreement is to commit an offence, the agreement alone completes the crime. (B) confuses conspiracy with unlawful assembly; (C) ignores that agreement is the gist; (D) is simply wrong. Section 120A is now Section 61(1) BNS, 2023.
Q9. Assertion (A): A Safai Karamchari engaged by a charitable trust was terminated; the trust challenged the award on the ground that it was not an "industry" under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, so Section 25-F did not apply. Reason (R): The trust engaged in multifarious activities including commercial ventures and hired employees for commercial and charitable activities in an organised manner with proper remuneration.
(A) Both true, (R) not the correct explanation
(B) (A) true, (R) false
(C) (A) false, (R) true
(D) Both true, and (R) is the correct explanation of (A)
Answer: (D) — on the triple test in Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa (1978), systematic activity organised by cooperation between employer and employee for the production or distribution of goods or services is an "industry", and the absence of a profit motive is irrelevant. The facts in (R) — organised activity, commercial ventures, paid employees — are exactly what defeats the trust's contention, so (R) explains (A).
Q10. Which is included in the Central Government's power under Section 3(2)(ii) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986?
(A) Collection and dissemination of information relating to environmental pollution
(B) Laying down standards for the quality of the environment
(C) Planning and execution of a nation-wide programme for the prevention, control and abatement of environmental pollution
(D) Carrying out and sponsoring investigations and research
Answer: (C) — the clauses of Section 3(2) are numbered, and clause (ii) is the nation-wide programme power. The other three options are also Central Government powers under Section 3(2), but under different clauses — standards of environmental quality fall under clause (iii), research under clause (x) and information under clause (xi). This is a pure clause-numbering question, and open-book candidates should have gone to the bare Act.
Q11. Under the IT Act, 2000, "electronic record" includes: I. Data stored in digital form II. Image or sound stored or transmitted electronically III. Information generated in microfilm or computer-generated microfiche IV. Information recorded only on paper without electronic processing. Which are correct?
(A) I, II and III
(B) II, III and IV
(C) I, II, III and IV
(D) I and II
Answer: (A) — Section 2(1)(t) defines an electronic record as data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro film or computer generated micro fiche. Microfilm and microfiche are expressly included, so III is in. Paper untouched by electronic processing is not an electronic record, so IV is out.
Q12. A pension scheme differentiates between employees retiring before and after a cut-off date. Those excluded challenge the classification as arbitrary. The constitutional issue primarily attracts:
(A) Legislative competence of the State
(B) Doctrine of eclipse
(C) Doctrine of severability
(D) Article 14 and the principle of classification
Answer: (D) — a cut-off date challenge is a classic Article 14 question tested on the twin requirements of intelligible differentia and rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) is the standard authority on pension cut-off dates. Eclipse and severability concern the effect of unconstitutionality, not the test for it.
Q13. In Harish Chandra Tiwari v. Baiju, (2002) 2 SCC 67, on punishment for misappropriation of a client's money by an advocate, the Supreme Court held that:
(A) A monetary penalty equal to double the amount is appropriate
(B) Reprimand is appropriate for a first-time misappropriation
(C) Suspension for five years is the standard sanction
(D) Misappropriation is among the gravest forms of professional misconduct and ordinarily warrants removal of the advocate's name from the State roll
Answer: (D) — the Court treated misappropriation of client funds as occupying the gravest end of the spectrum of professional misconduct, precisely because the relationship is fiduciary, and held that removal from the roll is the ordinary consequence. Nothing in the judgment supports a tariff of fines or fixed suspensions.
Q14. A State plans to acquire 50 acres of Scheduled Tribes land for an industrial park, proposing (i) preliminary notification (ii) Social Impact Assessment (iii) Gram Sabha consultation/consent (iv) final notification. Which statement is correct?
(A) Final notification can be issued without Gram Sabha, with owner consent only
(B) Gram Sabha is advisory only; consent is not needed for public projects
(C) SIA and Gram Sabha consultation/consent are mandatory for ST land; acquisition can't proceed without consent
(D) Final notification can come before SIA but after preliminary notification
Answer: (C) — under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, the Social Impact Assessment under Sections 4 to 9 is mandatory, and Section 41 provides special safeguards for Scheduled Areas requiring the prior consent of the Gram Sabha. Read with the PESA Act, 1996, Gram Sabha consent in Scheduled Areas is a condition precedent, not a formality.
Q15. Under the CrPC, 1973, which provision defines a "bailable offence"?
(A) Section 2(h)
(B) Section 2(x)
(C) Section 2(a)
(D) Section 2(c)
Answer: (C) — Section 2(a) CrPC defines "bailable offence" and "non-bailable offence" together. Section 2(c) is cognizable offence and Section 2(h) is investigation — both common distractors. The corresponding definition is now in Section 2(1)(d) BNSS, 2023.
Q16. The IT Act, 2000 distinguishes civil from criminal liability for misuse of computer resources. When would conduct attract criminal punishment rather than mere compensation?
(A) When the damage exceeds a prescribed monetary limit
(B) When the affected party chooses to initiate criminal proceedings
(C) When access is without permission, irrespective of intent
(D) When the act is done dishonestly or fraudulently in addition to unauthorised access
Answer: (D) — Section 43 imposes civil liability for unauthorised access and damage, without any mental element. Section 66 converts the same conduct into an offence only if it is done dishonestly or fraudulently, those words carrying their IPC meanings. The dividing line is mens rea, not quantum, and not the complainant's choice.
Q17. Under the CPC, 1908, where a court finds certain averments in pleadings unnecessary and capable of prejudicing or delaying fair trial, it may:
(A) Strike out such pleadings at any stage of proceedings
(B) Ignore such pleadings without passing any order
(C) Direct amendment only after trial begins
(D) Reject the plaint in entirety
Answer: (A) — Order VI Rule 16 empowers the court, at any stage, to strike out or amend any matter which is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial. Rejecting the whole plaint is a different and far more drastic power under Order VII Rule 11.
Q18. On which date did the BNSS, 2023 come into force, replacing the CrPC, 1973?
(A) 15 August 2023
(B) 1 January 2024
(C) 25 December 2023
(D) 1 July 2024
Answer: (D) — all three new criminal codes, the BNS, the BNSS and the BSA, came into force on 1 July 2024. They received assent in December 2023, which is where option (C) comes from; assent and commencement are different things.
Q19. Which landmark case expanded the scope of Article 23 of the Constitution?
(A) Glaxo Laboratories v. Presiding Officer, (1984) 1 SCC 1
(B) Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241
(C) PUDR v. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 235
(D) M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 6 SCC 756
Answer: (C) — the Asiad Workers' case held that "forced labour" under Article 23 covers not only physical or legal compulsion but also compulsion arising from economic circumstances, so that payment of less than the minimum wage amounts to forced labour. Vishaka is Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 on sexual harassment; M.C. Mehta (Tamil Nadu) is child labour under Article 24.
Q20. Parmanand Katara v. Union of India (1989) is primarily associated with which right?
(A) Right to emergency medical care
(B) Right to clean and healthy environment
(C) Right to speedy trial
(D) Right to life and personal liberty
Answer: (A) — the Court held that every doctor, whether at a government hospital or otherwise, has a professional obligation to extend immediate medical aid to preserve life, and that legal formalities and procedural criminal law cannot be allowed to delay it. Option (D) is true at a general level but (A) is the specific holding, and in a "primarily associated with" question the specific answer wins.
Q21. Statement: The BCI derives rule-making power from Section 49(1)(c) of the Advocates Act, 1961. Rule 20 bars an advocate from stipulating for or receiving a fee dependent on the outcome of litigation, or sharing in its proceeds. Contravention attracts Section 35. Conclusion I: An advocate may lawfully enter an outcome-linked fee arrangement if the client's written consent is obtained beforehand. Conclusion II: An advocate violating the contingency-fee prohibition may face disciplinary action under the Act.
(A) Neither follows
(B) Both follow
(C) Only Conclusion II follows
(D) Only Conclusion I follows
Answer: (C) — the prohibition on contingency fees is absolute and is not capable of being waived by client consent, so Conclusion I does not follow. Conclusion II simply restates the Section 35 consequence stated in the statement itself, so it follows.
Q22. The Supreme Court gradually relaxed the traditional rule of locus standi, allowing public-spirited individuals to approach the Court for enforcement of the fundamental rights of others. This is most closely associated with:
(A) Judicial review of administrative action
(B) The evolution of Public Interest Litigation
(C) Expansion of writ jurisdiction under Article 226
(D) Enforcement of fundamental rights through individual petitions alone
Answer: (B) — the relaxation of standing is the defining feature of PIL, associated with S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) and the epistolary jurisdiction that followed. Option (D) states the opposite of what happened.
Q23. Under the CPC, 1908, where a suit is instituted against a person subsequently found to have been wrongly impleaded as a defendant, the court may:
(A) Return the plaint on the ground of mis-joinder
(B) Dismiss the suit as not maintainable
(C) Direct the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit
(D) Permit substitution or addition of the proper defendant
Answer: (D) — Order I Rule 10 allows the court at any stage to strike out or add parties, and Rule 9 provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of mis-joinder or non-joinder of parties. Dismissal or a fresh suit would defeat the express purpose of Rule 9.
Q24. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 is not applicable in which case?
(A) Arbitral Tribunal
(B) National Company Law Tribunal
(C) National Green Tribunal
(D) Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
Answer: (A) — Section 1(2) BSA applies the Adhiniyam to judicial proceedings in or before any court, but it does not apply to arbitration. Section 19(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 puts it beyond doubt: an arbitral tribunal is not bound by the CPC or the law of evidence. The other three tribunals are statutory adjudicatory bodies that broadly follow evidentiary principles.
Q25. Under the BNS, 2023, "Forfeiture of Property" is listed as a punishment. In which case is it most commonly applied?
(A) Organized Crime (Section 111)
(B) Offences involving simple hurt or minor physical injury
(C) Instances of minor or petty theft
(D) Cases of rash or negligent driving
Answer: (A) — forfeiture of property is one of the punishments listed in Section 4 BNS, and it attaches to the grave economic and organised-crime offences. Section 111 BNS, which brings organised crime into the general penal law for the first time, expressly provides for forfeiture. It has no application to simple hurt, petty theft or negligent driving.
Questions 26 to 50
Q26. Which of the following is not an example of the eggshell skull rule in the law of torts?
(A) Nervous shock cases, where injury from nervous shock is reasonably foreseeable to an ordinarily strong-nerved person in the victim's position
(B) A boy kicked another across a classroom aisle; the victim had an unknown microbial condition that was irritated, and he lost the use of the limb
(C) A patient underwent an appendectomy; the surgery went as planned but she continued to have abdominal pain, and a needle was later found inside her
(D) A man had a heart attack and died after being bruised in the chest in a rear-end collision
Answer: (C) — the eggshell skull (or thin skull) rule says a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him, so an unusual pre-existing vulnerability does not reduce liability for the full extent of the harm. (B) and (D) are textbook applications. (C) is not: a needle left inside a patient is a fresh negligent act, and the case is one of medical negligence and res ipsa loquitur, with no pre-existing susceptibility in play.
Q27. Statement I: The ossification test is the final test to analyse bone fusion for estimating the age of a juvenile as per law. Statement II: Statutory documents like a birth certificate will be given precedence to determine juvenility.
(A) Both true
(B) Only Statement I is true
(C) Both false
(D) Only Statement II is true
Answer: (D) — the hierarchy in Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 is settled: the matriculation certificate first, then the birth certificate from the school first attended, then the birth certificate from a corporation or panchayat, and only in the absence of all three an ossification or other medical age test. The ossification test is therefore a last resort and not "final"; Statement I is wrong and Statement II is right.
Q28. Repeated re-promulgation of Ordinances without placing them before the Legislature was described as a "fraud on the Constitution" in which decision?
(A) Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 3 SCC 1
(B) R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564
(C) Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192
(D) D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 579
Answer: (D) — D.C. Wadhwa exposed the Bihar practice of keeping ordinances alive for years by successive re-promulgation and coined the phrase "fraud on the Constitution". Krishna Kumar Singh (2017) is the later Constitution Bench that reaffirmed and extended it, which makes (A) the most tempting distractor — but the phrase originates in Wadhwa.
Q29. Under Section 378 IPC, which is an essential element of "theft"?
(A) The property must be removed from a public location exclusively
(B) The unauthorised movement of immovable property without consent
(C) The employment of physical force or criminal violence
(D) The movement of movable property out of a person's possession without their consent
Answer: (D) — theft requires dishonest intention, movable property, taking out of another's possession, without consent, and moving it. (B) fails because immovable property cannot be stolen; (C) describes robbery or extortion, not theft; (A) is invented. Section 378 is now Section 303 BNS, 2023.
Q30. Can a landowner who enters a Joint Development Agreement, contributing land for 50% of the developed property plus a deposit, complain under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 about defects and delay?
(A) A consumer unless profit motive is proven
(B) A consumer as he did not construct himself
(C) Not a consumer, as the transaction constitutes a commercial joint venture
(D) A consumer if defects exist, irrespective of the nature of the transaction
Answer: (C) — "consumer" in Section 2(7) excludes a person who obtains goods or services for a commercial purpose. A joint development agreement in which the landowner contributes land and takes a share of the developed built-up area is a commercial venture between collaborators sharing risk and profit, not a service hired for consideration. The parties are co-adventurers, and the remedy lies in contract or arbitration.
Q31. Under Rule 8 of the Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette framed by the BCI, an advocate is prohibited from appearing before any court, tribunal or authority for or against an organisation of which he is a member of its:
(A) Executive Committee
(B) General Body
(C) Sub-Committee
(D) Advisory Committee
Answer: (A) — Rule 8 uses the words "Executive Committee". The reasoning is one of conflict: an advocate on the body that directs the organisation cannot also appear for or against it. Mere membership of the general body does not attract the bar. Note: the widely circulating coaching key gives (C), which is simply wrong on the text of the Rule.
Q32. A Magistrate of the Second Class passes a sentence of one month's imprisonment. Under the CrPC, 1973:
(A) The accused is entitled to appeal to the Court of Session
(B) An appeal lies only if a fine was also imposed
(C) The accused may appeal directly to the High Court
(D) No appeal is maintainable
Answer: (A) — under Section 374(3) CrPC an appeal from conviction by a Magistrate of the first or second class lies to the Court of Session. The bar on appeals in petty cases under Section 376 does not apply, because a substantive sentence of imprisonment has been passed. The provision is now Section 415 BNSS, 2023.
Q33. Under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, for what duration can maintenance be awarded?
(A) A fixed term not exceeding ten years
(B) A maximum of five years only
(C) A period determined solely by the Registrar
(D) A term not exceeding the life of the plaintiff
Answer: (D) — Section 40 of the Act empowers the court to order permanent alimony and maintenance for a term not exceeding the life of the plaintiff. Maintenance statutes across personal laws use this life-of-the-claimant ceiling rather than a fixed number of years, and a Registrar has no such power.
Q34. Under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, what is the maximum fine for printing or publishing matter in contravention of the provisions on in-camera proceedings?
(A) Up to five thousand rupees
(B) Up to two thousand rupees
(C) Up to five hundred rupees
(D) Up to one thousand rupees
Answer: (D) — Section 33 provides for proceedings to be held in camera and prescribes a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees for publishing matter in contravention. This is a pure bare-Act recall question of the kind the AIBE sets to reward candidates who actually carry the statutes into the hall.
Q35. Under Section 362 IPC, which is not a mandatory ingredient of "abduction"?
(A) Compelling or inducing a person to move from one place to another
(B) The employment of force or deceitful means
(C) Classification of the act as a "continuing offence"
(D) The person abducted must be a minor
Answer: (D) — abduction under Section 362 applies to any person of any age; age is irrelevant. That is the key distinction from kidnapping from lawful guardianship under Section 361, which is age-based (16 for males, 18 for females). The two ingredients of abduction are force or deceitful means, and compelling a person to go from any place. Abduction is now Section 138 BNS, 2023.
Q36. Parliament legislates to implement India's obligations under an international environmental agreement. The subject ordinarily falls in the State List and no Article 252 resolution has been passed. Parliament's competence flows from:
(A) Article 252
(B) Article 249
(C) Article 253
(D) Article 250
Answer: (C) — Article 253 empowers Parliament to legislate on any subject, including a State List entry, to implement a treaty, agreement or international convention. Article 252 needs resolutions by two or more State Legislatures, which the facts exclude. Article 249 needs a Rajya Sabha resolution in the national interest, and Article 250 operates only during a Proclamation of Emergency.
Q37. Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Statement I: The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction. Statement II: A plea that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence, unless the tribunal permits a later plea.
(A) Both true
(B) Neither true
(C) Only Statement I is true
(D) Only Statement II is true
Answer: (A) — both restate Section 16. Sub-section (1) embodies kompetenz-kompetenz, the tribunal's power to rule on its own jurisdiction including on the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. Sub-section (2) fixes the time limit at the submission of the statement of defence, with sub-section (4) allowing a later plea if the tribunal considers the delay justified.
Q38. Under Section 105 BNSS, 2023, what is now mandatory for search and seizure by the police?
(A) Presence of a Judicial Magistrate during the search
(B) Documentation of the entire search and seizure process by audio-video electronic recording
(C) Presence of at least five local residents as independent witnesses
(D) A signed written confession from the occupant
Answer: (B) — Section 105 BNSS is one of the genuinely new provisions of the 2023 Sanhita. It requires the search and the preparation of the list of seized items to be recorded by audio-video electronic means, preferably a mobile phone, and the recording to be forwarded to the Magistrate without delay. This is a central point of departure from the CrPC and a standard examination target.
Q39. Under the CPC, 1908, where a decree is passed against multiple defendants, one of whom was not served and had no opportunity to contest, that defendant may seek relief:
(A) By applying for setting aside the ex-parte decree
(B) Only by filing a separate suit
(C) Only through an appeal against decree
(D) Only through review before the same court
Answer: (A) — Order IX Rule 13 allows a defendant against whom an ex parte decree is passed to apply to set it aside on proof that summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing. Appeal and review exist but the options wrongly present them as exclusive; the direct and appropriate remedy is Order IX Rule 13.
Q40. In Roman jurisprudence, the concept similar to the Rule of Law was referred to as:
(A) Jus Gentium
(B) Jus Naturale
(C) Lex Regia
(D) Jus Civile
Answer: (B) — jus naturale, natural law, was the body of universal principles binding on all — the Roman analogue of a higher law to which even rulers are subject, which is the core of the Rule of Law. Jus gentium was the law applied between peoples, jus civile the law of Roman citizens, and lex regia the theory by which the people transferred power to the emperor — the opposite of the idea. Note: the circulating coaching key gives (A).
Q41. Under Section 10(37) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, compensation received by an individual on compulsory acquisition of agricultural land used for agricultural purposes before acquisition is:
(A) Always taxable
(B) Taxable only if it exceeds a prescribed limit
(C) Taxable as business income
(D) Exempt, subject to fulfilment of prescribed conditions
Answer: (D) — Section 10(37) exempts such capital gains where the conditions are met: the land was situated in a specified area, it was used for agricultural purposes for the two years immediately preceding by the individual or a parent, the transfer was by compulsory acquisition, and the compensation was received on or after 1 April 2004. The exemption is conditional, not automatic.
Q42. Under the CPC, 1908, an application seeking transfer of a pending case from one district to another within the State may be ordered:
(A) Only upon agreement between the parties
(B) Only by the court in which the suit is pending
(C) Only after conclusion of trial
(D) By the High Court
Answer: (D) — Section 24 confers general power of transfer and withdrawal on the High Court and on the District Court. Transfer across districts within a State is beyond a District Court's territorial reach and lies with the High Court. Consent of parties is not required, and a transfer after trial would be pointless.
Q43. An employment contract bars Ramesh from joining any rival software firm in India for three years after resignation. He resigns and joins a competitor; the employer sues to enforce the clause. Under the Indian Contract Act, 1872:
(A) Valid — three years is reasonable
(B) Void — restrains a lawful profession after employment ends
(C) Valid — Ramesh agreed voluntarily
(D) Valid — protects the employer's business interest
Answer: (B) — Section 27 makes every agreement in restraint of a lawful profession, trade or business void, subject only to the sale-of-goodwill exception. Indian law does not import the English test of reasonableness. A restraint operating during employment may be enforceable, but a post-employment non-compete is void, however short or however freely agreed — Superintendence Company of India v. Krishan Murgai is the standard authority.
Q44. A contracts with B to build a cold storage for Rs 50 lakh in 6 months. B fails to perform. A immediately hires C to complete it for Rs 60 lakh and sues B for the Rs 10 lakh difference. Under the Specific Relief Act, 1963:
(A) A must sue only for damages and not substituted performance
(B) A can recover Rs 10 lakh because B breached the contract
(C) A cannot recover the cost because A did not give B prior notice
(D) A can recover only if the court first declares B guilty of breach
Answer: (B) — this is the official answer, and it treats the case as ordinary compensation for breach. A caution worth recording: Section 20 of the Act, as substituted in 2018, permits substituted performance but sub-section (2) says no such substituted performance shall be undertaken unless the party has given notice in writing of not less than thirty days to the party in breach. On facts that stress A hired C "immediately", option (C) has a serious claim, and many candidates marked it. The BCI considered objections and retained (B). Learn the official position, but know why (C) is arguable.
Q45. The BNSS, 2023 introduced a timeframe for delivery of judgment after conclusion of arguments. What is it?
(A) A strict period of 15 days
(B) Within 30 days, extendable to 45 days
(C) Within 90 days, with reasons for delay recorded
(D) Within 60 days from the date of reserving the order
Answer: (B) — the Sanhita imposes outer time limits at several stages, and for judgment it requires pronouncement within thirty days of completion of arguments, extendable to forty-five days for reasons recorded in writing. This timeline-driven approach is one of the defining features of the BNSS and is heavily examined.
Q46. The term "Public Interest Litigation" was first used by:
(A) Justice P.N. Bhagwati
(B) Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer
(C) Prof. Upendra Baxi
(D) Prof. Abram Chayes
Answer: (D) — the expression originates in American public-law scholarship, and Prof. Abram Chayes of Harvard is credited with introducing it, notably in his 1976 work on the role of the judge in public law litigation. Justices Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer developed PIL in India and Prof. Baxi wrote influentially about it, which is what makes all three attractive distractors; the question asks who used the term first.
Q47. In which case did Lord Wright observe that "the incalculable value of habeas corpus is that it enables the immediate determination of the applicant's freedom"?
(A) A.G. for Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu (1983) 2 AC 629
(B) A.G. for New South Wales v. Trethowan (1932) AC 526
(C) Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1942) AC 284
(D) Bugdaycay v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (1987) AC 514
Answer: (C) — Greene was one of the wartime detention appeals decided alongside Liversidge v. Anderson, and Lord Wright's observation on the value of habeas corpus comes from it. Ng Yuen Shiu is legitimate expectation, Trethowan is manner and form in constitutional amendment, and Bugdaycay is anxious scrutiny in asylum cases.
Q48. Under the BNS, 2023, what is the range of punishments available for defamation?
(A) Simple imprisonment, or fine, or both, or community service
(B) Rigorous imprisonment for 5 years
(C) Only a fine
(D) Only an apology in open court
Answer: (A) — defamation is Section 356 BNS, and sub-section (2) prescribes simple imprisonment up to two years, or fine, or both, or community service. The introduction of community service as a recognised punishment for the first time in Indian penal law is one of the headline changes made by the BNS, and this question is testing precisely that.
Q49. Under the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872, between which hours must a marriage generally be solemnised?
(A) Between five in the morning and six in the evening
(B) Between six in the morning and seven in the evening
(C) Between seven in the morning and eight in the evening
(D) Between six in the morning and nine in the evening
Answer: (B) — Section 10 of the Act requires solemnisation between six in the morning and seven in the evening, subject to the exception permitting a Clergyman of the Church of England to act under a special licence from the Anglican Bishop. Another bare-Act recall question.
Q50. On withdrawal and abandonment of suits under the CPC, 1908: I. A plaintiff may withdraw or abandon a suit subject to law. II. Institution of a fresh suit on the same cause of action requires permission of the court. III. Withdrawal without such permission bars a subsequent suit on the same cause of action. IV. The court must grant permission whenever requested. Which are correct?
(A) I, III and IV
(B) I, II, III and IV
(C) II, III and IV
(D) I, II and III
Answer: (D) — Order XXIII Rule 1 permits withdrawal, requires leave for a fresh suit on the same cause of action, and by sub-rule (4) bars a fresh suit where withdrawal was without leave. Statement IV is wrong: leave is discretionary, granted only where the suit must fail by a formal defect or there are other sufficient grounds. Any option containing IV is therefore excluded.
Questions 51 to 75
Q51. Under Section 25(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, where the respondent fails to submit his statement of defence without sufficient cause, the tribunal shall:
(A) Continue the proceedings without treating such failure as an admission
(B) Decide the dispute treating the claimant's case as uncontroverted
(C) Terminate the proceedings
(D) Treat the claimant's allegations as admitted
Answer: (A) — Section 25(b) is deliberately worded: the tribunal shall continue the proceedings without treating that failure in itself as an admission of the claimant's allegations. Default does not shift the burden; the claimant must still prove its case. Contrast the CPC, where an ex parte order carries different consequences.
Q52. Which innovative penal measure has been incorporated into the sentencing framework under Section 4 BNS, 2023?
(A) Compulsory forfeiture of ancestral property
(B) Community Service
(C) Solitary confinement
(D) Life imprisonment without possibility of parole
Answer: (B) — Section 4 BNS lists the punishments, and community service is the genuinely new entry, applied to a set of comparatively minor offences including petty theft, defamation and misconduct in public by a drunken person. Solitary confinement and forfeiture already existed under the IPC, so neither is "innovative".
Q53. Once a Proclamation under Article 352 is in operation, Parliament may legislate on State List matters by virtue of:
(A) Article 356
(B) Article 249
(C) Article 250
(D) Article 360
Answer: (C) — Article 250 is the provision that expands Parliament's legislative field to the State List while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation. Article 249 needs a Rajya Sabha resolution and operates independently of emergency; Article 356 is President's Rule; Article 360 is financial emergency.
Q54. A, an 18-year-old of sound mind, signs an instrument: "I promise to pay B Rs 75,000 on 1st April next year." All essentials of a promissory note are present. A defaults and B sues.
(A) Valid only if a third party signs as witness
(B) The promissory note is valid; A is liable to pay B
(C) Void because it does not mention consideration
(D) Voidable at A's option since A is only 18
Answer: (B) — 18 is the age of majority, so A is competent under Section 11 of the Contract Act. A promissory note need not state consideration: Section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 raises a presumption that every negotiable instrument was made for consideration. No attesting witness is required.
Q55. The adoption of an Ombudsman-type institution in India was first recommended by:
(A) Administrative Reforms Commission, 2005
(B) Santhanam Committee, 1964
(C) Administrative Reforms Commission, 1966
(D) India Against Corruption Movement, 2011
Answer: (C) — the First Administrative Reforms Commission, in its 1966 interim report on problems of redress of citizens' grievances, recommended the two-tier institution of Lokpal and Lokayukta. The Santhanam Committee (1964) dealt with prevention of corruption more broadly, and 2011 is far too late.
Q56. Which correctly states the composition of a Disciplinary Committee of a Bar Council under Section 9(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961?
(A) Five members — three elected, two co-opted senior advocates
(B) Five members — all co-opted from advocates of not less than ten years' standing
(C) Three members — two elected from the Council's membership and one co-opted advocate possessing the prescribed qualifications, who is not a member of the Council
(D) Three members — all elected, with the most junior as Chairman
Answer: (C) — Section 9(1) requires each Disciplinary Committee to consist of three persons, two elected by the Council from among its members and one co-opted by the Council from advocates who possess the qualifications specified in Section 3(2) and are not members of the Council. Section 9(2) makes the senior-most advocate the Chairman, which disposes of (D).
Q57. Under the CPC, 1908, where a suit has abated for failure to bring legal representatives on record in time, the court may set aside the abatement if the plaintiff shows:
(A) That the defendant had knowledge of death
(B) Sufficient cause for not making the application within time
(C) That decree has not yet been passed
(D) Error apparent on the face of record
Answer: (B) — Order XXII Rule 9(2) allows abatement or dismissal to be set aside where the plaintiff proves that he was prevented by sufficient cause from continuing the suit. Error apparent on the face of the record is the test for review under Order XLVII, not for setting aside abatement.
Q58. In which year did mandatory pre-fitment of High Security Registration Plates for all new vehicles come into effect under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988?
(A) 2019
(B) 2018
(C) 2024
(D) 2023
Answer: (A) — pre-fitment of HSRP by the manufacturer or dealer for all new vehicles became mandatory with effect from 1 April 2019. Retro-fitment for older vehicles was rolled out State by State much later, which is the source of the confusion behind the 2023 and 2024 distractors.
Q59. A transfers land to a trust: the property is to be used forever for a public library and reading room; if it ceases to be so used it reverts to his heirs; and the income is to accumulate for 50 years before being used for expansion. Which is correct?
(A) Void — violates perpetuity and accumulation limits
(B) Entirely void — the reversionary clause creates uncertainty
(C) Valid as it falls within the exception for public benefit, but the accumulation clause is void to the extent it exceeds statutory limits
(D) Valid in entirety, as public purposes are fully exempt from perpetuity restrictions
Answer: (C) — Section 18 of the Transfer of Property Act exempts transfers for the benefit of the public in advancement of religion, knowledge, commerce, health, safety or any other object beneficial to mankind from the perpetuity rule, so the library trust survives. But Section 17 caps accumulation of income at the life of the transferor or eighteen years from the date of transfer, whichever is longer. Fifty years exceeds that, and the direction is void only as to the excess — the transfer itself stands.
Q60. Under the Uniform Civil Code Rules, Uttarakhand, 2025, when is an application for declaration of legal heir(s) forwarded to the Registrar General?
(A) After thirty days of receipt if the Registrar does not act
(B) After ten days
(C) After fifteen days of receipt if the Registrar does not act
(D) None of the above
Answer: (C) — the official key gives fifteen days. This is one of the hardest questions in the paper, drawn from a State subordinate instrument made under the Uttarakhand UCC and barely a year old at the date of the examination. It is a reminder that the AIBE now reaches into very recent legislation, and that an open-book candidate carrying only the central bare Acts would have had no way to answer it. Note: the circulating coaching key gives (B).
Q61. Under Section 35B CPC, 1908, where a party fails to take a step required by the court on the date fixed, the court may:
(A) Grant adjournment as a matter of right
(B) Impose costs as a precondition for allowing further prosecution
(C) Dismiss the suit
(D) Proceed without imposing any condition
Answer: (B) — Section 35B is the costs for causing delay provision. The court orders the defaulting party to pay costs occasioned by the delay, and payment of those costs is a condition precedent to further prosecution of the suit or defence. Adjournment is never a matter of right.
Q62. Which provision of the CrPC, 1973 requires production of a person arrested without warrant before a Magistrate within 24 hours?
(A) Section 41
(B) Section 164
(C) Section 51
(D) Section 57
Answer: (D) — Section 57 CrPC, the statutory counterpart of the constitutional guarantee in Article 22(2), forbids detention beyond twenty-four hours (excluding journey time) without a Magistrate's order. Section 167 is the remand provision and is the standard trap here. Section 57 is now Section 58 BNSS, 2023.
Q63. During a war, India declares Country X an enemy. A, an Indian citizen, contracts to supply medicines to B, a citizen of X, through a neutral intermediary and bank. Under the Indian Contract Act, 1872:
(A) Void — trading with an enemy in war is prohibited and against public policy
(B) Valid — goods are humanitarian and payment is via a neutral country
(C) Voidable — only the Government can cancel
(D) Valid unless the Government expressly cancels
Answer: (A) — trading with the enemy is a recognised head of public policy under Section 23, and such a contract is void, not voidable. Routing goods through a neutral intermediary does not cure the illegality, and the humanitarian character of the goods goes to whether a licence might be granted, not to validity.
Q64. An opinion rendered by the Supreme Court on a Presidential reference under Article 143 is generally regarded as:
(A) Enforceable through contempt jurisdiction
(B) Advisory in nature and not strictly binding
(C) A binding precedent under Article 141
(D) Equivalent to a decree of the Court
Answer: (B) — Article 143 confers advisory jurisdiction. The Court "may" report its opinion, there is no lis and no decree, and the opinion binds nobody in the manner of a judgment inter partes. It carries very high persuasive weight and is followed in practice, but that is not the same as being binding under Article 141.
Q65. A executes a document: "I hereby sell my house to B for Rs 5,00,000. If I repay within 3 years, B shall retransfer; otherwise the sale shall become absolute." The condition is in the same document. A fails to repay.
(A) It is a mortgage by conditional sale; B must seek foreclosure through court
(B) Void for uncertainty
(C) A lease with an option to repurchase
(D) An outright sale; B becomes absolute owner automatically
Answer: (A) — Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, and specifically its proviso, is decisive: the transaction is a mortgage by conditional sale only if the condition is embodied in the same document that effects the sale. It is, so this is a mortgage. B cannot take absolute title automatically; he must sue for foreclosure under Order XXXIV. The placement of the condition is the entire point of the question.
Q66. Section 233 of the Companies Act, 2013 deals with "fast track merger". What is the time duration and the approving authority?
(A) 60–90 days, Regional Director
(B) 45–90 days, NCLAT
(C) 60–90 days, NCLT
(D) 1 year, Regional Director
Answer: (A) — the whole point of the fast-track route for small companies, holding and wholly-owned subsidiaries and certain other classes is that it bypasses the NCLT. The scheme is approved by the Central Government acting through the Regional Director, on the indicative timeline in the section and the Rules. Any option naming the NCLT or NCLAT defeats the purpose of Section 233.
Q67. Judicial intervention in arbitration is limited by Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. When may a court intervene?
(A) When procedural irregularity is alleged without specific provision in the Act
(B) When both parties request supervision
(C) When the court considers the award unjust on facts
(D) When the Act expressly permits such intervention
Answer: (D) — Section 5 opens with a non obstante clause and states that no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in Part I. That is the whole architecture of the Act: intervention is the exception, listed in provisions such as Sections 8, 9, 11, 27, 34 and 37. A court reappraising an award on the facts is precisely what Section 5 forbids.
Q68. A singer contracts to perform exclusively for one company for two years and not to perform for any other. After a year he refuses and begins performing for a competitor. The company sues for an injunction restraining him.
(A) The injunction may be granted to enforce the negative covenant
(B) Must be refused because contracts of personal service cannot be enforced
(C) The court must compel him to sing for the first company
(D) Only damages can be granted
Answer: (A) — the classic Lumley v. Wagner position, given statutory form in Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. A contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced, so (C) is wrong; but the court may enforce the negative stipulation by injunction. The distinction is between compelling him to sing for you and restraining him from singing for anyone else.
Q69. Under Section 167 CrPC, default bail is a right of the accused if investigation is not completed:
(A) After a fixed 30 days for all offences
(B) On expiry of 120 days for offences against the State
(C) After 60 or 90 days, depending on the maximum punishment prescribed
(D) Immediately after the initial 15-day police custody
Answer: (C) — the proviso to Section 167(2) fixes ninety days where the offence is punishable with death, life imprisonment or imprisonment of not less than ten years, and sixty days otherwise. On expiry the accused is entitled to be released on bail if he is prepared to furnish it, and the right is indefeasible if exercised before the charge sheet is filed. This is now Section 187(3) BNSS, 2023.
Q70. Which Article forms the primary legislative basis for Parliament enacting the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981?
(A) Article 252
(B) Article 233
(C) Article 253
(D) None of the above
Answer: (C) — the preamble to the Air Act expressly recites the decisions taken at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972, and Parliament's power to implement them. That is Article 253. Contrast the Water Act, 1974, which was enacted on State resolutions under Article 252 — the Water/Air, 252/253 pairing is one of the most reliably examined distinctions in environmental law. Note: the circulating key gives (D).
Q71. Under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, what condition applies for appointing a guardian for a married female minor?
(A) The husband must be declared legally incompetent
(B) The husband must be considered unfit by the Court
(C) The parents must apply jointly
(D) The husband must consent
Answer: (B) — the Act proceeds on the footing that the husband is the natural guardian of a married female minor, and the court will appoint another guardian of her person only where it is of opinion that the husband is not fit. The test is judicial satisfaction of unfitness, not a declaration of legal incompetence and not the husband's consent.
Q72. Under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, within how many months from the date of marriage must dowry received before marriage be transferred to the woman?
(A) Six months
(B) Seven months
(C) Three months
(D) Five months
Answer: (C) — Section 6 creates a trust in favour of the woman and prescribes three timelines: where dowry is received before the marriage, within three months of the date of marriage; where received at or after the marriage, within three months of receipt; and where the woman was a minor, within three months of her attaining eighteen. The recurring figure is three months.
Q73. An assessee pays medical insurance premium for himself and his family and claims a deduction. Under the Income Tax Act, 1961:
(A) Not permitted
(B) Allowed subject to prescribed limits and conditions
(C) Allowed without any monetary limit
(D) Allowed only for senior citizens
Answer: (B) — Section 80D allows deduction of medical insurance premium subject to ceilings that vary with the age of the insured and whether the claim covers parents, and subject to the mode of payment condition. It is neither unlimited nor confined to senior citizens; senior citizens simply get a higher ceiling.
Q74. Under the IPC, 1860, in which scenario does the right of private defence of the body extend to voluntarily causing death?
(A) A simple assault without a weapon
(B) Theft where the value exceeds Rs 10,000
(C) An assault committed with the intention of kidnapping or abducting a person
(D) Criminal trespass on open, vacant land
Answer: (C) — Section 100 IPC lists the seven situations in which the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death, and assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting is one of them. Value of property is irrelevant to defence of the body, and a simple assault never justifies killing. Section 100 is now Section 38 BNS, 2023.
Q75. Under Section 173 BNSS, 2023, where a police officer in charge decides an investigation is not warranted, within what period must the informant be notified?
(A) 24 hours
(B) 14 days
(C) 7 days
(D) 30 days
Answer: (B) — fourteen days is the figure the Sanhita uses in Section 173. The section also introduces the preliminary enquiry for offences punishable with three years or more but less than seven years, to be conducted within fourteen days with the prior permission of a senior officer. Fourteen days is the number to memorise for Section 173.
Questions 76 to 100
Q76. X takes a loan from Bank A; Y is surety. The bank later reduces the interest rate and extends repayment by 6 months without informing Y. X then defaults. Y's liability under the Contract Act, 1872 is:
(A) Y is partially discharged because the modification increased his risk without his consent
(B) Y is fully liable, as a surety is always liable on default
(C) Y is not liable at all
(D) Y is liable only if the bank sues the principal debtor first
Answer: (A) — two sections bite. Section 133 discharges a surety where the terms are varied without his consent, and does so as to transactions subsequent to the variance — which is what makes the discharge partial rather than total. Section 135 discharges a surety where the creditor contracts to give time to the principal debtor. Option (B) is wrong because a surety is not an insurer, and (D) misstates the law: under Section 128 the liability of a surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor and the creditor need not exhaust remedies against him first.
Q77. Which does not fall under the framework of presumption under Section 2 of the BSA, 2023?
(A) Conclusive proof
(B) Shall presume
(C) Unassailable proof
(D) May be
Answer: (C) — the Adhiniyam carries forward the three familiar categories: "may presume" (discretionary), "shall presume" (mandatory but rebuttable) and "conclusive proof" (irrebuttable). "Unassailable proof" is not a term used anywhere in the Act; it is invented.
Q78. Assertion (A): The right to privacy has been judicially recognised as an integral part of Article 21. Reason (R): Privacy is expressly enumerated as a separate Fundamental Right in Part III. (In the context of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.)
(A) (A) false, (R) true
(B) Both true, (R) explains (A)
(C) (A) is true, but (R) is false
(D) Both true, (R) does not explain (A)
Answer: (C) — the assertion is correct: Puttaswamy held privacy to be intrinsic to life and liberty under Article 21. The reason is false, and that is the entire point of the question. Privacy is not a separately enumerated fundamental right; it was read into Article 21. Had it been expressly enumerated, the nine-Judge Bench would have been unnecessary.
Q79. A subject not enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List falls within the residuary field. Residuary power is vested in:
(A) The State Legislatures
(B) The Parliament
(C) The President of India
(D) The Supreme Court of India
Answer: (B) — Article 248, read with Entry 97 of the Union List, vests residuary powers of legislation exclusively in Parliament. India follows the Canadian model here, unlike the United States and Australia where the residue is left with the States.
Q80. "The rules of natural justice were not confined to the narrow precincts of the prevailing definition of quasi-judicial functions." This was laid down in:
(A) Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) AC 40
(B) Conway v. Rimmer (1968) AC 910
(C) Maradana Mosque Trustees v. Mahmud (1967) 1 AC 13
(D) A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 150
Answer: (A) — Ridge v. Baldwin is the decision that broke the artificial confinement of natural justice to functions labelled "quasi-judicial", restoring the principle to administrative decisions generally. Kraipak is the Indian decision that followed Ridge and blurred the administrative/quasi-judicial line here, which makes (D) the strongest distractor; but the principle originates in Ridge. Conway v. Rimmer is Crown privilege. Note: the circulating key gives (D).
Q81. "Administrative law is the law concerning the powers and procedures of administrative agencies, including especially the law governing judicial review of administrative action." This definition was given by:
(A) Ivor Jennings
(B) K.C. Davis
(C) A.V. Dicey
(D) H.W.R. Wade
Answer: (B) — this is Kenneth Culp Davis's definition, and its distinguishing feature is the express inclusion of judicial review. Jennings defined administrative law as the law relating to administration; Dicey famously denied that England had administrative law at all; Wade is the leading English textbook writer on the subject.
Q82. The five Golden Principles on circumstantial evidence were laid down in:
(A) Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622
(B) Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P.
(C) Vasa Chandrasekhar Rao v. Ponna Satyanarayana
(D) Dr. Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab
Answer: (A) — the panchsheel of circumstantial evidence: the circumstances from which guilt is drawn must be fully established; the facts must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt; the circumstances must be of a conclusive nature and tendency; they must exclude every possible hypothesis except guilt; and the chain must be so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with innocence. This is among the most cited passages in Indian criminal law. Note: the circulating key gives (B), which is plainly wrong.
Q83. Under Section 20 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, where the parties have not agreed on the place of arbitration, the tribunal shall determine it having regard to:
(A) Place where the contract was executed
(B) Circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties
(C) Jurisdiction of the civil court alone
(D) Location of subject matter of dispute
Answer: (B) — Section 20(2) uses exactly this formula: the tribunal determines the place "having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties". Section 20(3) separately allows the tribunal to meet at any place it considers appropriate for consultation, hearing witnesses or inspecting documents.
Q84. Under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, the minimum term of imprisonment for giving or taking dowry is:
(A) Not less than ten years
(B) Not less than five years
(C) Not less than three years
(D) Not less than seven years
Answer: (B) — Section 3 prescribes imprisonment of not less than five years and a fine of not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the dowry, whichever is more. The court may impose a lesser term for adequate and special reasons to be recorded, but the statutory minimum is five years.
Q85. Assertion (A): An ex parte decree may be set aside if the defendant satisfies the court that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing. Reason (R): Under Order IX Rule 13 CPC the court must be satisfied that summons was not duly served or that the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing.
(A) Both true, (R) does not explain (A)
(B) (A) true, (R) false
(C) (A) false, (R) true
(D) Both true and (R) is the correct explanation of (A)
Answer: (D) — both propositions are accurate statements of Order IX Rule 13, and the reason is simply the statutory source of the assertion. Where the reason states the very provision from which the assertion is derived, it is by definition the correct explanation.
Q86. Under which provision of the BNS, 2023 has the definition of a "terrorist act" been integrated into India's general penal legislation for the first time?
(A) Section 152
(B) Section 109
(C) Section 113
(D) Section 121
Answer: (C) — Section 113 BNS defines and punishes a terrorist act, bringing into the general penal code an offence that previously lived only in special legislation such as the UAPA. Section 152 is the offence endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, which replaced sedition, and is the most common wrong answer here.
Q87. Under the BNSS, 2023, an accused intending to apply for plea bargaining must do so within how many days of the framing of charges?
(A) 7 days
(B) 15 days
(C) 60 days
(D) 30 days
Answer: (D) — thirty days from the date of framing of charge. This limit is new: the CrPC allowed a plea bargaining application at any time after the report or complaint, with no outer window. The BNSS closes it, consistently with its general approach of putting time limits on every stage of the process.
Q88. Assertion (A): Income-tax is levied on the total income of a person for the previous year. Reason (R): Income earned during the previous year is assessed to tax in the immediately succeeding assessment year.
(A) Both true, (R) does not explain (A)
(B) (A) false, (R) true
(C) Both true and (R) is the correct explanation of (A)
(D) (A) true, (R) false
Answer: (C) — both are correct, and the relationship between "previous year" (Section 3) and "assessment year" (Section 2(9)) is the mechanism by which the charge in Section 4 operates. The reason explains why the charge attaches to the previous year's income.
Q89. Which is not stated in Section 63(4) BSA, 2023 regarding the certificate verifying authenticity of electronic evidence?
(A) Signed by both the person in charge of the device and an expert, in the format prescribed in the Schedule
(B) The form requires electronic evidence to be accompanied by a "hash value"
(C) Qualification of an expert
(D) None of the above
Answer: (C) — Section 63(4) BSA requires the certificate in the form in the Schedule, signed by the person in charge of the computer or communication device and an expert, and the Schedule form requires the hash value of the electronic record. What the provision does not do is prescribe the qualifications an expert must hold — a genuine and much-criticised gap in the new Adhiniyam.
Q90. A mandatory PUC Certificate is provided under which Section and Rule?
(A) s 120(3) MV Act and Rules 122–123 CMVR
(B) s 190(2) MV Act and Rules 115–116 CMVR
(C) s 160(1) MV Act and Rules 109–110 CMVR
(D) s 177(3) MV Act and Rules 117–118 CMVR
Answer: (B) — Section 190(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 penalises driving a vehicle in violation of the standards prescribed for emission of air pollutants, read with Rules 115 and 116 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, which prescribe the emission standards and the Pollution Under Control certificate regime.
Q91. Under the Patents Act, 1970, which correctly reflects a limitation on the patentee's rights?
(A) The patentee loses all rights once the invention is used by the Government
(B) The Government may use the invention for its own purposes without the consent of the patentee
(C) The invention cannot be used by the Government without permission
(D) The patent becomes void if used by a government authority
Answer: (B) — Section 100 permits the Central Government and any person authorised by it to use a patented invention for the purposes of Government, without the patentee's consent. The patentee is not stripped of the patent and does not lose it; he is entitled to remuneration on terms agreed or, failing agreement, fixed by the High Court. It is a limitation on exclusivity, not a forfeiture.
Q92. What is meant by onus probandi?
(A) Burden of proof, placing responsibility on the party making an affirmative claim to substantiate it with evidence
(B) The fact to be proved, or ultimate fact
(C) The prosecution's obligation to prove act and guilty mind beyond reasonable doubt
(D) The actual evidence, documents or witnesses presented
Answer: (A) — onus probandi is the burden of proof, expressed in the maxim ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat — proof lies on him who asserts, not on him who denies. Option (B) describes the factum probandum, and (D) the factum probans: distinguishing the three is exactly what the question is testing.
Q93. Minority shareholders allege that promoters sold preference shares to a promoter-controlled trust well below fair market value, causing loss to the company. Conclusion I: They may file a class action under Section 245 of the Companies Act, 2013 before the NCLT seeking reversal or compensation. Conclusion II: Aggrieved members may proceed individually against oppression and mismanagement under Section 241.
(A) Neither follows
(B) Both follow
(C) Only Conclusion II follows
(D) Only Conclusion I follows
Answer: (B) — the two remedies are concurrent, not alternative. Section 245 provides a class action before the NCLT where the affairs are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to the company or its members, with express power to claim damages against directors and others. Section 241 provides the separate oppression and mismanagement remedy. Related-party dealing below fair value squarely engages both.
Q94. Under Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, a sum of money received without consideration from a non-relative exceeding the prescribed limit is:
(A) Fully exempt
(B) Taxable only if received in cash
(C) A capital receipt, not taxable
(D) Taxable under the head "Income from Other Sources"
Answer: (D) — where the aggregate exceeds Rs 50,000 in a previous year, the whole of it is chargeable under Income from Other Sources. The mode of receipt is irrelevant. The section carves out receipts from relatives, on marriage, under a will or inheritance, and certain other cases.
Q95. Under the Copyright Act, 1957: Statement I: In a posthumous literary work, copyright subsists for sixty years from the beginning of the calendar year next following the year of first publication. Statement II: Publication means making the work available to the public by issue of copies or communication to the public.
(A) Both false
(B) Only II true
(C) Both true
(D) Only I true
Answer: (C) — Statement I reflects Section 24, which for posthumous works runs the sixty-year term from the year following first publication rather than from the author's death. Statement II reflects the definition of publication in Section 3. Both are accurate.
Q96. Which statement is not true with respect to Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?
(A) The Section 65B(4) certificate is a condition precedent to admissibility of an electronic record
(B) Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (2020) 7 SCC 1 is the latest interpretation, offering a consistent approach in line with legislative intent
(C) In P.V. Anvar v. P.K. Basheer the court held Section 65B is a "complete code" for electronic evidence
(D) In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, AIR 2005 SC 3820, the Court held that printouts and CDs could be admitted as prima facie evidence without authentication
Answer: (D) — and the reasoning needs care. As a description of what Navjot Sandhu decided in 2005, (D) is accurate. It is "not true" as a statement of law today, because Navjot Sandhu was expressly overruled on this point in P.V. Anvar v. P.K. Basheer (2014), and the position was settled by the three-Judge Bench in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (2020). The question is testing whether you know that the Navjot Sandhu route no longer exists.
Q97. Which is not included in the Industrial Relations Code, 2020?
(A) Trade Unions Act, 1926
(B) Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951
(C) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(D) Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
Answer: (B) — the IR Code consolidates exactly three statutes: the Trade Unions Act, 1926, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The IDR Act, 1951 is industrial licensing and regulation legislation, not labour law, and was never part of the labour codification.
Q98. Which is not a document as per the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023?
(A) Caricature
(B) Map
(C) Inscription
(D) Private papers
Answer: (D) — the definition of "document" is followed by illustrations which expressly name a map or plan, an inscription on a metal plate or stone and a caricature. "Private papers" appears in none of them. The question rewards a candidate who has actually read the illustrations rather than only the definition.
Q99. Under the CPC, 1908, where the plaintiff fails to pay the requisite court fee or postal charges for service of summons within the time permitted, the court may:
(A) Stay the proceedings until service is effected
(B) Proceed to decide the suit on merits
(C) Return the plaint for fresh presentation
(D) Dismiss the suit
Answer: (D) — Order IX Rule 2 provides in terms that where the summons is not served in consequence of the plaintiff's failure to pay the court fee or postal charges, the court may make an order that the suit be dismissed. Rule 4 allows the plaintiff to apply to set that dismissal aside on satisfying the court there was sufficient cause.
Q100. Under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, which situation makes the consent of a wife unnecessary for adoption?
(A) She has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion
(B) She refuses consent due to personal disagreement
(C) She is living separately without legal separation
(D) None of the above
Answer: (A) — the proviso to Section 7 dispenses with the wife's consent in three cases only: she has completely and finally renounced the world, she has ceased to be a Hindu, or she has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind. Mere refusal, or living separately without a decree, does not dispense with consent — which is precisely why (B) and (C) are wrong.
Consolidated Answer Key — AIBE XXI, Set A (BCI Final Key)
| Q | Ans | Q | Ans | Q | Ans | Q | Ans |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A | 26 | C | 51 | A | 76 | A |
| 2 | C or D | 27 | D | 52 | B | 77 | C |
| 3 | B | 28 | D | 53 | C | 78 | C |
| 4 | B | 29 | D | 54 | B | 79 | B |
| 5 | A | 30 | C | 55 | C | 80 | A |
| 6 | D | 31 | A | 56 | C | 81 | B |
| 7 | A | 32 | A | 57 | B | 82 | A |
| 8 | A | 33 | D | 58 | A | 83 | B |
| 9 | D | 34 | D | 59 | C | 84 | B |
| 10 | C | 35 | D | 60 | C | 85 | D |
| 11 | A | 36 | C | 61 | B | 86 | C |
| 12 | D | 37 | A | 62 | D | 87 | D |
| 13 | D | 38 | B | 63 | A | 88 | C |
| 14 | C | 39 | A | 64 | B | 89 | C |
| 15 | C | 40 | B | 65 | A | 90 | B |
| 16 | D | 41 | D | 66 | A | 91 | B |
| 17 | A | 42 | D | 67 | D | 92 | A |
| 18 | D | 43 | B | 68 | A | 93 | B |
| 19 | C | 44 | B | 69 | C | 94 | D |
| 20 | A | 45 | B | 70 | C | 95 | C |
| 21 | C | 46 | D | 71 | B | 96 | D |
| 22 | B | 47 | C | 72 | C | 97 | B |
| 23 | D | 48 | A | 73 | B | 98 | D |
| 24 | A | 49 | B | 74 | C | 99 | D |
| 25 | A | 50 | D | 75 | B | 100 | A |
Bold entries are the nine questions on which the widely circulating coaching key differs from the BCI final key.
What This Paper Tells You About AIBE 22
Four things are worth carrying into your preparation for the next examination.
The new codes are being tested directly and by section number. Section 105 BNSS on audio-video recording of searches, Section 113 BNS on terrorist acts, Section 4 BNS on community service, Section 63(4) BSA on the electronic evidence certificate, the thirty-day plea bargaining window, the judgment timeline. These are not general awareness questions; they require the section number.
Old-code numbering is still being asked. Sections 120A, 362, 378 and 100 IPC, Sections 57, 125, 167 and 374 CrPC all appear. Carrying only the new bare Acts into the hall would have cost marks. Take both.
Bare-Act recall questions are free marks in an open-book exam. The fine under the Special Marriage Act, the hours under the Christian Marriage Act, the clause numbering in Section 3(2) of the Environment Act, the PUC section and rules. None of these can be reasoned out; all of them can be looked up. Index your bare Acts.
The paper now reaches into very recent and State legislation. A question on the Uttarakhand Uniform Civil Code Rules, 2025 — subordinate legislation of a single State, roughly a year old — appeared in this paper. That is a meaningful widening of the field.
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Disclaimer: This is a solved paper prepared for the free use of candidates preparing for the All India Bar Examination. The questions are reproduced from the AIBE XXI (Set Code A) paper held on 7 June 2026 for the purpose of study, review and commentary. The answers given are those in the final answer key published by the Bar Council of India on 10 July 2026 for Set Code A; the explanations are the author's own and are not official. Candidates writing other set codes should note that the BCI key covers Sets A, B, C and D separately and the option letters differ between sets. The comparison with a circulating third-party answer key is offered as a caution to candidates and reflects our reading of the two documents as available at the time of writing; the BCI key alone is authoritative and should be downloaded from allindiabarexamination.com. Where a question is defective or the official answer is open to argument, this has been said so expressly in the explanation rather than glossed over. Statutory provisions and case law are stated in outline for revision purposes and must be verified against the bare Acts and the full reports before being relied on, particularly given the renumbering effected by the BNS, BNSS and BSA, 2023. This site is not connected with the Bar Council of India and no endorsement is claimed. Nothing here is legal advice. Please read our Disclaimer for more details.
