The Supreme Court has held that for land acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956, solatium, interest and interest on solatium are to be computed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 wherever the Competent Authority determined compensation before 1 January 2015 — and under the Right to Fair Compensation Act, 2013 only where that determination came on or after that date.
The judgment in Manav Bhanot v. National Highway Authority of India, delivered on 8 September 2026 by Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, answers a question the Court says was res integra despite three rounds of Tarsem Singh litigation. The stake is not small. Solatium under the 1894 Act is 30% of market value. Under the 2013 Act it is 100% of the compensation amount, on a market value already multiplied by a factor. Which statute governs is, for most landowners on a National Highway alignment, the single largest variable in the file.
And the answer turns on one thing only: the date of the Competent Authority’s determination under Section 3G(1). Not the date of the Section 3A notification. Not the date of the Section 3D declaration. Not the date of the Arbitrator’s award.
The case at a glance
| Case | Manav Bhanot v. National Highway Authority of India |
| Neutral citation | 2026 INSC 973 · 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 915 |
| Proceeding | Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 27541 of 2024 |
| Bench | J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ. |
| Judgment by | K. Vinod Chandran, J. |
| Date | 8 September 2026 · Reportable |
| Counsel | Sr. Adv. Harin P. Raval for the appellant · Sr. Adv. Ankur Mittal for NHAI |
| Result | Appeal allowed in part. Solatium, interest and interest on solatium granted, but computed under the 1894 Act. Matter remanded to the Competent Authority for computation and disbursal |
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Manav Bhanot v. National Highway Authority of India, 2026 INSC 973 — 18 pages. If the viewer does not load on your device, use the button above.
The problem, in one paragraph
Section 3J was inserted into the National Highways Act by Act 16 of 1997 and made the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 inapplicable to highway acquisitions. Because Section 3G(7) of the NH Act provides no solatium, and Section 3H(5) awards a flat 9% interest without the escalation the 1894 Act carries, a landowner on a highway alignment got materially less than a landowner acquired under the general law. In Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304 (Tarsem Singh-I), this Court struck down Section 3J as violative of Article 14.
That settled that solatium and interest are payable. It did not settle under which statute they are to be computed — and after 2013 there were two candidates.
Why 1 January 2015, and not 1 January 2014
This is the mechanical heart of the judgment, and it is worth following because the dates are easy to get wrong.
- The 2013 Act came into force on 1 January 2014.
- But Section 105(1) provides that the Act “shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule”. The National Highways Act, 1956 is Item 7 of that Fourth Schedule.
- Section 105(3) required the Central Government, within one year of commencement, to direct by notification that the compensation and rehabilitation provisions in the First, Second and Third Schedules — “being beneficial to the affected families” — would apply to Fourth Schedule enactments.
- Ordinance 9 of 2014 amended Section 105(3) to provide that those Schedules “shall apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule with effect from 1st January, 2015”. That was extended by Ordinance 5 of 2015 and carried through by notification.
So there was a deliberate one-year hiatus. The 2013 Act reached general acquisitions on 01.01.2014 and highway acquisitions only on 01.01.2015. As the Court puts it:
“Hence, but for Section 105 of the Act of 2013, it would have become applicable even to the NH Act from the date of its effective operation i.e. 01.01.2014. Section 105 extended the period in which it becomes applicable for a period of one year…”
And the Court reads a purpose into that year:
“The intention as we discern is to provide a period of one year from the date of effect of the Act of 2013 for the Competent Authority under the NH Act to determine the compensation, deemed to be the initial award, insofar as the acquisition proceedings taken prior to the Act of 2013.”
What counts as the “award” under the NH Act
Having fixed the date, the Court had to fix the event. The NH Act does not use the word “award” for the Competent Authority’s order, and the appellant seized on that: his fallback was that the Arbitrator’s award, made after 01.01.2015, should be the reference point.
The Court rejected it by mapping the NH Act scheme onto the 1894 Act scheme, provision by provision:
| Stage | Land Acquisition Act, 1894 | National Highways Act, 1956 |
|---|---|---|
| Preliminary notification | s. 4 | s. 3A (Gazette plus two local newspapers, one in the vernacular) |
| Objections and hearing | s. 5A (30 days) | s. 3C |
| Declaration | s. 6 (within 3 years of s. 4) | s. 3D (within 1 year of s. 3A) — vesting occurs here |
| The award / initial determination | s. 11 (within 2 years of declaration) | s. 3G(1) — determination by the Competent Authority |
| Deposit before possession | — | s. 3H(1), read with s. 3E |
| Challenge to quantum | s. 18 reference to the Court | s. 3G(5) — reference to an Arbitrator appointed by the Central Government |
The conclusion is stated in terms:
“The determination made by the Competent Authority of the compensation under sub-section (1) of Section 3G and the determination of the dispute raised under sub-section (5), by the Arbitrator, under the NH Act are respectively in the nature of the award passed under Section 11 and the determination by a Civil Court, on a reference made to it under Section 18 of the Act of 1894.”
An Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) is therefore doing what a reference court does under Section 18. A reference court’s decree has never fixed the applicable statute; the Collector’s award does. The same follows here. The Arbitrator’s date is irrelevant to the choice of enactment.
This is the practical takeaway of the whole judgment. If you are advising on a highway acquisition file, the date you look for is on the Competent Authority’s Section 3G(1) order, and nothing else.
Reconciling the Tarsem Singh trilogy
The appellant’s principal argument rested on Tarsem Singh-II, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 235, where NHAI had asked that Tarsem Singh-I be applied prospectively so that concluded acquisitions would not be reopened. The Court there refused, observing in paragraph 19 that it would be untenable to give solatium and interest to a landowner acquired on 01.01.2015 while denying it to one acquired on 31.12.2014. If that distinction is impermissible, said the appellant, so is this one.
The answer is a careful and, once seen, obvious distinction between entitlement and quantification:
“Tarsem Singh-I reckoned this very malady of solatium and interest not being entitled to acquisitions between 1997 and 2014… That is why Section 3J was struck down, but that is only to declare the benefit of solatium and interest being applicable across the years and not to determine under which enactment such benefit is to be granted.”
And again:
“Tarsem Singh-II does not lay down as a proposition that solatium and interest before 01.01.2015 would also have to be computed based on the provisions under the Act of 2013, not even from its effect, i.e.: 01.01.2014…”
The Court also disposes of Tarsem Singh-III, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 481, on which NHAI relied, noting that it “was only concerned with the proceedings which had attained finality”. Hence the express finding that the issue agitated here is res integra.
| Decision | Citation | What it actually decided |
|---|---|---|
| Tarsem Singh-I | (2019) 9 SCC 304 | Section 3J of the NH Act struck down as violative of Article 14. Solatium and interest are payable on highway acquisitions. |
| Tarsem Singh-II | 2025 SCC OnLine SC 235 | NHAI’s plea for prospective operation of Tarsem Singh-I declined; that would nullify the relief granted. |
| Tarsem Singh-III | 2026 SCC OnLine SC 481 | Concerned only proceedings that had attained finality. |
| Manav Bhanot | 2026 INSC 973 | Which enactment governs the computation — 1894 Act for pre-01.01.2015 Section 3G(1) determinations, 2013 Act thereafter. |
The Constitution Bench point
The Court anchors its award-referenced approach in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129, quoting paragraph 366.1:
“Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.”
The logic is then carried across:
“Even going by the Constitution Bench decision, the application of the Act of 2013 arises with reference to the award made… even if the proceedings for acquisition were commenced prior to 01.01.2014.”
So the general rule under Section 24(1)(a) is that the award date governs, with 01.01.2014 as the pivot. For Fourth Schedule enactments including the NH Act, Section 105 moves that pivot forward by exactly one year, to 01.01.2015. The principle is the same; only the date differs.
The MoRTH notification argument — and a point of construction worth keeping
The appellant’s last submission was on a notification of the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, clause 4.6(c):
“All cases of Land acquisition where the Awards had not been announced under Section 3G of the NH Act till 31.12.2014 or where such awards had been announced but compensation had not been paid in respect of majority of the land holdings under acquisition as on 31.12.2014, the compensation would be payable in accordance with the First Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.”
The appellant said the majority of landowners had not been paid by 31.12.2014. The Court’s answer is a single sentence of construction, and it is the sharpest line in the judgment:
“In fact, we must notice that the word employed in the notification is the majority of the ‘land holdings’ and not the ‘landowners’.”
The test is therefore by area, not by headcount. On the record, of 3.080 hectares acquired, compensation for 1.700 hectares had been paid in 2014 — a majority of the land holdings. The notification did not assist.
Note carefully what this leaves open. Clause 4.6(c) is still a live route to the 2013 Act even where the Section 3G(1) award predates 01.01.2015 — but the landowner invoking it must establish that compensation for a majority of the acquired area remained unpaid on 31 December 2014. That is a documentary exercise on the acquisition as a whole, not on the claimant’s own holding, and it will usually require the Competent Authority’s disbursement record for the entire alignment. In this case NHAI produced exactly that as Annexure R-1. Any practitioner running the argument should be seeking those figures early.
What was at stake
The contrast the Court was choosing between is stark. Under the 1894 Act, Section 23(2) gives solatium at 30% of market value; Section 23(1A) an additional 12% per annum on market value from the Section 4 notification to the award or possession, whichever is earlier; and Sections 28 and 34 give interest at 9% for the first year and 15% thereafter.
Under the 2013 Act, as the Court itself records while extracting Tarsem Singh-I:
“The First Schedule to the said Act provides that solatium equivalent to 100% of the market value multiplied by various factors, depending on whether the land is situated in a rural or urban area, constitutes minimum compensation package to be given to those whose land is acquired.”
Thirty per cent against a hundred, on a base that has itself been multiplied. For an acquisition of any size, the difference between a Section 3G(1) order dated December 2014 and one dated January 2015 is measured in crores. That is the plain consequence of this judgment, and it should be said rather than glossed over.
The facts and the timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 07.06.2011 | Notification under Section 3A published in the Official Gazette |
| 01.07.2011 | Published in an English newspaper and in Hindi |
| — | Objections called for under Section 3C(1) and considered |
| 20.01.2012 | Declaration under Section 3D(1) published in the Official Gazette and in two newspapers |
| 01.09.2012 | Notice to landowners for determination of compensation |
| 11.07.2014 | Competent Authority, NH-7 and Sub-Divisional Officer, Jabalpur determines compensation — total ₹3,47,38,287 |
| 13.10.2014 | Appellant receives his share, ₹49,17,000; disputes quantum |
| 01.01.2015 | 2013 Act becomes applicable to NH Act acquisitions |
| 13.01.2016 | Arbitrator’s order |
| — | Challenges under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 |
| 08.09.2026 | Supreme Court judgment |
The Section 3G(1) determination therefore fell on the wrong side of the line by less than six months. The Court records the position plainly:
“In the present case admittedly, the Competent Authority determined the compensation under the NH Act, which is akin to the award under the Act of 1894, passed on 11.07.2014, prior to the Ordinance which made applicable the benefits of the Act of 2013 to the NH Act w.e.f. 01.01.2015. Hence, though, the solatium, interest and interest on solatium is applicable, the same shall be computed based on the provisions of the Act of 1894.”
A note for those reading the judgment alongside this post: paragraph 18 of the reported text gives the date of the Competent Authority’s order as “11.07.2024”. That appears to be a typographical slip for 11.07.2014 — the date given in paragraphs 4 and 24, and the only date consistent with the appellant having received his money on 13.10.2014. There is a second, smaller discrepancy: paragraph 5 records the appellant’s submission that the Arbitrator’s award was passed on 17.05.2017, while paragraph 18 gives 13.01.2016 for the Arbitrator’s order. Neither affects the reasoning, since the Arbitrator’s date is immaterial on the Court’s own holding.
The rule, stated
| Date of determination under Section 3G(1), NH Act | Solatium, interest and interest on solatium computed under |
|---|---|
| Before 01.01.2015 (including between 01.01.2014 and 31.12.2014) | Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — solatium 30%, interest 9% and 15% |
| On or after 01.01.2015 | RFCTLARR Act, 2013 — First Schedule, solatium 100% |
Two riders. First, entitlement itself is never in doubt for any period after 1997 — that is Tarsem Singh-I, and Section 3J is gone. Second, clause 4.6(c) of the MoRTH notification can still carry a pre-2015 award into the 2013 Act, but only on proof that compensation for a majority of the acquired area was unpaid as on 31.12.2014.
What this judgment does not decide
- It does not disturb Tarsem Singh-I. Section 3J remains unconstitutional and solatium and interest remain payable on every NH Act acquisition, whenever made.
- It does not permit the reopening of concluded matters. Tarsem Singh-II declined prospective operation, and Tarsem Singh-III dealt with proceedings that had attained finality; this judgment concerns the measure of the benefit, not its availability.
- It does not hold that clause 4.6(c) of the MoRTH notification is otiose. It holds only that on these facts, where compensation for the majority of the land holdings had been paid in 2014, it did not assist.
- It does not address the position where the Competent Authority makes no determination at all, or where a Section 3G(1) determination is set aside and made afresh after 01.01.2015. Those questions remain open.
For the practitioner
If you act for landowners. Pull the Section 3G(1) order first and check its date before advising on quantum — everything else follows from it. Where the date falls in 2014, the 2013 Act argument is now foreclosed on the general ground, and clause 4.6(c) is the remaining route: start collecting the alignment-wide disbursement position as on 31.12.2014, by area, at the earliest opportunity, because the Competent Authority holds those figures and NHAI will produce them if you do not. Note also that a favourable arbitral award does not improve the position on the choice of statute, however late it comes.
If you act for the acquiring body. The judgment is a clean answer to the argument that Tarsem Singh-II requires 2013 Act rates across the board. The distinction between declaring an entitlement and fixing its measure is now expressly drawn, and the Section 3G(1)-to-Section 11 equivalence is the reasoning to cite.
For everyone. The larger point is one of statutory reading. A saving provision that defers the application of a beneficial statute — here Section 105 of the 2013 Act — is not a technicality to be argued away by reference to the Article 14 reasoning that struck down a different provision. The Court has taken the one-year hiatus seriously and given it a purpose. That is worth remembering the next time a Fourth Schedule enactment is in issue: the Fourth Schedule has thirteen entries, and the NH Act is only one of them.
Disclaimer: This post is a summary and analysis prepared for the information of readers and does not constitute legal advice. The judgment is reproduced in full above; readers should rely on the judgment itself and not on this summary. The observations regarding the apparent typographical discrepancies in the reported dates, and the practical guidance on clause 4.6(c) of the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways notification, are the writer’s own. Lawizard.in accepts no responsibility for any action taken on the basis of this post.
Sources: Manav Bhanot v. National Highway Authority of India, 2026 INSC 973, Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 27541 of 2024, decided 8 September 2026 (Supreme Court of India); LiveLaw report, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 915; Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304; Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 235; National Highways Authority of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 481; Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129; National Highways Act, 1956, sections 3A to 3J; Land Acquisition Act, 1894, sections 4, 5A, 6, 11, 18, 23, 28 and 34; Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, sections 24, 105 and 113 and the First and Fourth Schedules.
