Case Comment by Akinchan Aggarwal, Advocate — B.A. (Hons.) Gold Medalist, LL.B. (University Rank 2), LL.M. (Dispute Resolution), UGC–NET, Ph.D. (Pursuing)
A woman was taken to hospital for a blood test. She objected. She was persuaded. The blood was drawn, the test was done, the report went to the police station.
For that, an FIR was registered against her. A chargesheet was filed. The Bombay High Court refused to quash it. And it took until 12 August 2026 — five years and three months after the incident — for the Supreme Court to say what should have been obvious on the day the FIR was written: resisting your own medical examination is not obstructing a public servant.
The most striking feature of this case is that the prosecution's own FIR contained the sentence that destroyed it.
The case
Ashwini Anantrao Deshpande v. State of Maharashtra
Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8692 of 2026
2026 LiveLaw (SC) 859
Bench: Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice Arun Palli
Decided: 12 August 2026
Result: Bombay High Court (Nagpur) order dated 19 November 2025 set aside; FIR and chargesheet quashed.
The Facts
The appellant was a Lekhapal at the Forest Range Office, Paratwada. On 4 May 2021, the Forest Range Officer sent a letter to the police stating that she had been found in an intoxicated state at 1:00 p.m. and was causing a disturbance, and that the matter was being referred to the Sub-District Hospital, Achalpur.
A Sub-Inspector and three constables accompanied her and the forest department staff to the hospital. The FIR then records what happened, in the informant's own words:
"She tried to resist the examination and was creating a scene; however, she was persuaded. Blood was collected, and the report was submitted to Police Station Achalpur, for action."
On that narration, FIR No. 0131/2021 was registered at Police Station Achalpur, District Amravati Rural, for offences under Sections 186 and 189 IPC and Sections 110 and 117 of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951. A chargesheet followed, pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Achalpur.
The appellant moved the Bombay High Court at Nagpur for quashing under Section 528 BNSS. On 19 November 2025, the High Court declined.
The Sentence That Decided the Case
Read the FIR extract again. It contains two admissions, and each is independently fatal to the prosecution.
First: "she was persuaded." Not restrained, not overpowered, not arrested for obstruction — persuaded. Whatever resistance there was, it was of a kind that ordinary persuasion overcame. That is a description of reluctance, not of obstruction.
Second: "Blood was collected." The examination happened. The public function the officers had gone there to perform was performed, on the same day, at the same place, by the same people.
The Supreme Court fastened on exactly this. At paragraph 5 it observed that the allegations reveal "at best... a case where the appellant was supposed to have resisted her own medical examination", and that "it is also not disputed that subsequently she underwent the medical examination." At paragraph 6:
"We are of the opinion that the act attributed to the appellant will not be covered in the phrase 'voluntarily obstructs any public servants in the discharge of his public function' attracting offence under Section 186 of the IPC. The statements of the prosecution witnesses show that the appellant ultimately underwent the medical examination."
Why Section 186 Was Never Available
Section 186 IPC — now Section 221 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — punishes whoever "voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions", with imprisonment up to three months, or fine up to Rs 2,500, or both.
Three elements have to line up, and on these facts two of them collapse.
1. There must be an act of obstruction, not mere unwillingness. The section requires the accused to obstruct. Reluctance, protest, argument, or being upset are not obstruction. The obstruction must be something that actually impedes the officer. On the prosecution's own case, the officers were not impeded — they talked her round and got on with it.
2. What was obstructed must be the public servant's function. Here the "public function" was the examination of the appellant herself. That produces an odd shape: the person said to be obstructing the function is the same person who is its subject. Resisting a procedure being carried out on your own body is not, without more, an interference with the officer's discharge of duty in the sense the section contemplates.
3. The function must have been frustrated, or at least impeded. It was not. It was completed. An offence of obstruction is hard to sustain where the thing said to have been obstructed demonstrably happened.
Section 189: Not Even Arguable
Section 189 IPC — now Section 224 BNS — is a different offence altogether, and the Court set out its ingredients at paragraph 7:
It applies where a person holds out a threat of injury to a public servant, or to a person in whom that public servant is interested, for the purpose of inducing that public servant to do an act, or to forbear or delay doing an act, connected with the exercise of his public functions. It carries up to two years.
There is no allegation anywhere in the FIR of any threat of injury to anyone. The Court's response was appropriately short: "On the face of it the requirements are not attracted."
This is worth pausing on. Section 189 was not a borderline charge that failed on analysis. It was a charge with no factual foundation whatsoever in the complaint that carried it. It was added, one assumes, because it sits next to Section 186 in the Code.
The Maharashtra Police Act Charges
The Court was similarly unimpressed here, recording that it was "at a loss to understand how Sections 110/112 and 117 of the MP Act are attracted." The provisions, as the Court summarised them:
| Section | What it covers |
|---|---|
| 110 | Prohibits, inter alia, the use of indecent language or behaving in a disorderly manner in a street, place of public resort, office, station or station house |
| 112 | Threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned |
| 117 | Prescribes the penalty for contravention of Sections 99 to 116 — it creates no offence of its own |
Two observations the judgment leaves implicit. Section 117 is a penalty provision, not a charging provision; citing it without a sustainable substantive section under Sections 99 to 116 achieves nothing. And there is a small drafting slip in the record: the FIR and chargesheet invoked Sections 110 and 117, while the Supreme Court's order at paragraph 8 refers to "Sections 110/112 and 117" and then explains Section 112 as well. Nothing turns on it, since the Court found none of them attracted.
The Standard the Court Applied
Paragraph 10 states the test in seven words that every criminal practitioner should carry: "taking the prosecution's case at its highest, the offences as alleged, are not attracted."
This is the classic quashing standard. The court does not weigh evidence, resolve disputes of fact, or assess the credibility of witnesses at this stage. It assumes every allegation in the FIR and chargesheet to be true, and then asks a purely legal question: do these facts, if proved, constitute the offence charged? Where the answer is no, the proceedings are an abuse of process and continuing them serves nothing.
That is why this case was capable of being decided on a three-page order. Nothing was in dispute. The FIR said what it said, and what it said did not amount to either offence.
The Same Provisions Under the New Codes
The offence here is dated 4 May 2021, so the IPC governs the substantive charges — offences committed before 1 July 2024 continue under the old Code. But the quashing petition was filed and decided in 2025, so procedure was governed by the BNSS. The order itself shows the split: the High Court "declined to exercise jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023" in respect of offences "punishable under Sections 186 and 189 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860."
| Provision | Old | New |
|---|---|---|
| Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions | IPC s 186 | BNS s 221 |
| Threat of injury to public servant | IPC s 189 | BNS s 224 |
| Inherent power of the High Court (quashing) | CrPC s 482 | BNSS s 528 |
| Bar on cognizance without a public servant's complaint | CrPC s 195 | BNSS s 215 |
The Point the Court Did Not Need to Reach
There is a second, entirely independent problem with this prosecution, and the Supreme Court did not have to address it because the charges failed on their merits. Anyone defending a Section 186 case should know about it.
A court cannot take cognizance of Section 186 IPC on a police chargesheet.
Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC — now Section 215(1)(a)(i) BNSS — provides that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under IPC Sections 172 to 188 (in the BNSS formulation, BNS Sections 206 to 223, excluding 209) except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or of a public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate, or one authorised by him.
Section 186 IPC falls squarely inside that range, as does its successor, BNS 221. The offence being cognizable makes no difference: the bar is on the court taking cognizance, not on the police investigating. A chargesheet is not a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned.
But note the asymmetry. Section 189 IPC sits outside 172–188, and BNS 224 sits outside 206–223. The Section 195 bar does not touch the Section 189 charge at all. This is precisely the sort of distinction that gets lost when both sections are cited together as a pair.
To be clear about what this article is and is not saying: the Supreme Court did not decide this point, and the order does not disclose whether any written complaint under Section 195 was filed by the Forest Range Officer or the Sub-Inspector. The FIR extract carries a cryptic note about an application, M.C.C. No. 267/2021, filed on 21 May 2021, whose nature is not explained. The proposition offered here is narrower and general: when you meet a Section 186 IPC or Section 221 BNS charge arriving on a police report, check Section 195 CrPC / Section 215 BNSS first. It is frequently a complete answer, and it is available before any argument on the merits.
What the Order Does Not Tell Us
Two gaps in the record are worth noticing, because a careful reader should not fill them in with assumptions.
The statutory basis for the examination is not stated. The order does not say under what power the appellant was taken for medical examination. The referral came from her employer, the Forest Range Officer, not from an investigating officer in a registered case — on the narration, the FIR came after the examination, not before. The order does not address whether the examination was a service-rules matter, a police action, or something else. This matters, because the answer would determine what "public function" the officers were discharging in the first place — but since the charges failed anyway, the Court had no occasion to explore it.
Nothing is decided about intoxication at the workplace. Quashing the FIR says nothing about whether the appellant was intoxicated on duty, and nothing about any departmental consequences. A criminal prosecution failing for want of ingredients leaves disciplinary proceedings, which run on entirely different standards, exactly where they were.
Why This Small Order Matters
Sections 186 and 189 IPC are among the most casually invoked provisions in Indian policing. They are short, they are easy to type into a chargesheet, and they attach to almost any encounter that becomes unpleasant. They are also, on their terms, quite demanding: Section 186 needs an actual obstruction of an actual function, and Section 189 needs an actual threat of injury made for an actual purpose.
What this order does is refuse to let those requirements be diluted into "she was difficult." That is a modest holding. But its value lies in the timeline.
4 May 2021: incident, and the blood sample is taken the same afternoon. 2021: FIR and chargesheet. 2024: quashing petition in the High Court. 19 November 2025: High Court declines. 12 August 2026: Supreme Court quashes. Five years and three months, a chargesheet, a High Court petition, a Special Leave Petition and an appeal — to dispose of a case that the FIR itself showed could not stand. The person concerned was a government employee facing a criminal trial throughout. Where a charge is bad on its face, the cost of not saying so early is not measured in court time; it is measured in someone's years.
For the Exam
| Point |
|---|
| 1. Resisting one's own medical examination is not "voluntarily obstructing a public servant" under s 186 IPC / s 221 BNS — particularly where the examination was ultimately undergone. |
| 2. s 189 IPC / s 224 BNS requires a threat of injury to a public servant (or to someone in whom he is interested), for the purpose of inducing an act, forbearance or delay connected with his public functions. |
| 3. Quashing standard: taking the prosecution case at its highest, are the offences attracted? No weighing of evidence at that stage. |
| 4. s 117 MP Act is a penalty provision for contraventions of ss 99 to 116 — it creates no independent offence. |
| 5. s 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC / s 215(1)(a)(i) BNSS: no cognizance of IPC 172–188 (BNS 206–223, excluding 209) except on the written complaint of the public servant concerned. s 186 is inside the bar; s 189 is outside it. |
| 6. Transitional rule: offences before 1 July 2024 stay under the IPC; the procedure applied to them after that date is the BNSS. This order illustrates both in one paragraph. |
Related on Lawizard
- "No Coercive Steps" Means "Do Not Arrest": Interim Protection Does Not Bar a Charge Sheet — another Section 528 BNSS decision from this month.
- Section 420 No Longer Exists: Cheating, Criminal Breach of Trust and Misappropriation Under the BNS
- IPC to BNS Section Converter — search any section across both codes.
- Attempt, Abetment and Criminal Conspiracy — Sections 45 to 62, BNS 2023
Disclaimer: This is a case comment on the order of the Supreme Court of India in Ashwini Anantrao Deshpande v. State of Maharashtra, in the criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8692 of 2026, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 859, decided on 12 August 2026 by a Bench of K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli, JJ. It has been prepared from the text of the order for the guidance of law students and candidates preparing for judicial services, the AIBE, UGC-NET and university examinations. Passages in quotation marks are taken from the order; all other analysis — including the discussion of Section 195 CrPC and Section 215 BNSS, which the Supreme Court did not address, and the observations on what the record does not disclose — is the author's own commentary and is identified as such in the text. The facts are stated as allegations recorded in the FIR and the Court's narration; the quashing of the FIR is not a finding on the truth of those allegations, and this article expresses no view on the conduct of any person named or unnamed, nor on any departmental proceedings. IPC–BNS and CrPC–BNSS correspondences are given for study convenience and should be verified against the bare Acts. This is general legal information and not legal advice; a reader facing an actual prosecution should consult a lawyer. Please read our Disclaimer for more details.
